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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
Fear and Disgust in Childhood: Emotion Understanding, Attentional Processes, and 
Children’s Responses to Potential Threat 
 
by 
 
Parisa Parsafar 
 
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Psychology 
University of California, Riverside, September 2019 
Dr. Elizabeth Davis, Chairperson 
 
Fear and disgust are both evoked in response to a potential threat and motivate a broad 
range of behaviors and beliefs but knowledge of children’s experiences and 
understanding of these two emotions as different is limited. The purpose of this 
dissertation was to a) examine age-related differences in children’s differentiation of fear 
and disgust, b) investigate whether children’s attention differs across a disgust or fear 
context and relates to individual differences in how children understand and experience 
these emotions, and c) examine whether individual differences in important aspects of 
emotion development relate to children’s emotions and beliefs about a potential threat 
with real-world implications –  tap water.  
To capture fear and disgust intensity, 69 four- to seven-year-old children were 
interviewed about how scared and disgusted typical fear and disgust elicitors made them 
feel. Children were interviewed about their water-related preferences, emotions, and 
beliefs. To capture orienting, total looking duration, and disengagement attention 
processes, children’s visual attention towards and away from a disgust OR fear-relevant 
stimulus during a free-play episode was recorded. Children were invited to 
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approach/engage with evocative items and rated the intensity of their fear and disgust 
towards each. Children’s differentiation of fear and disgust was captured by correlating 
fear and disgust intensity ratings for the items presented hypothetically (interviews) and 
in person.  
Findings revealed that age did not relate to differentiation of fear and disgust. 
Children differentiated between fear and disgust more strongly when responding to 
disgust than fear elicitors and when asked about them hypothetically (interview) than in 
person. Attention patterns across the fear and disgust contexts were similar and did not 
relate to reported experiences of fear or disgust, or children’s preferences, negative 
emotions, and beliefs about tap water.  Children who reported more intense fear and 
disgust and those who demonstrated less awareness of the distinctions between fear and 
disgust reported more negative emotions towards tap water. Understanding of fear and 
disgust and their appraisals of tap water as potentially threatening should be addressed 
early in development to promote more sustainable water solutions and greater acceptance 
of tap water. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
People encounter potential threats that can evoke feelings of fear or disgust like 
eating expired foods, online dating, sharing beverages, driving at night, meeting a 
growling or slobbering dog, entering a dark or grimy space, or encountering a disfigured 
or sick stranger every day. The way potentially threatening situations are interpreted and 
responded to shapes a broad range of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors (e.g., food 
preferences, race biases, political ideologies, hygiene and health-related behaviors, 
morality, acceptance of recycled water; Curtis, De Barra, & Aunger, 2011; Haidt, 2003; 
Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Lilienfeld & Latzman, 2014; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009, 
Prinz, 2007). Although these diverse outcomes are crucial consequences of how people 
understand and experience their emotions, little empirical work has sought to clarify how 
people understand specific types of threats to be different – such as those that should be 
disgusting and those that should evoke fear. Both fear and disgust are evident very early 
in development, so a clearer understanding of how children differentiate between these 
distinct manifestations of potential threat would contextualize the developmental costs 
and benefits of the wide range of preferences, beliefs, and behaviors that arise in response 
to each of these emotions.  
Perceived threats that have the potential to result in personal harm may evoke 
disgust or fear, depending on an individual’s interpretation of the situation. Although the 
adult literature has placed substantial focus on understanding the psychological and 
behavioral consequences of exaggerated fear reactions, less work has focused on disgust 
and surprisingly little research has investigated how children’s understanding and 
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experiences of these two important negative emotions develop. Individual differences in 
adults’ emotional responses to perceived threats are linked to outcomes as diverse as 
political ideologies, racial biases, and even consumer behaviors (Banks & Hicks, 2015; 
Curtis, De Barra, & Aunger, 2011; Haidt, 2003; Lilienfeld & Latzman, 2014; Liu, Lin, 
Xu, Zhang, & Luo, 2015; Royzman, Cusimano, & Leeman, 2017; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; 
Prinz, 2007), but comparing how fear and disgust relate to children’s responses to 
potentially threatening situations they encounter in everyday life has not been tested.  
Despite the fact that both fear and disgust are felt early in development in 
response to potential threats, the majority of research on children’s fear and disgust 
responses has focused primarily on dysregulation of either emotion and the links to 
mental health problems (Buss & Kiel, 2013; Kessler et al., 2005, 2007; Olatunji, Cisler, 
McKay & Phillips, 2010; Olatunji, Lohr, Sawchuk, & Tolin, 2007). Rarely are the joint or 
dissociable consequences of fear and disgust on children’s developmental outcomes 
examined together, with the exception of one research group that largely focuses their 
work on understanding older children’s (e.g., ages 9 -14) risk for animal phobias (de 
Jong, Andrea, & Muris, 1997; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Leemreis, Passchier, 
Bouwmeester, 2009; Muris, Mayer, Huijding, & Konings, 2008). The purpose of this 
dissertation is thus to improve understanding of young children’s experiences of fear and 
disgust. In particular, this work aims to clarify children’s early understanding of these 
distinct threat-relevant emotions and investigate whether individual differences in 
children’s understanding and experiences of fear and disgust carry developmental 
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consequences for children’s preferences, emotions, and beliefs about potential threats 
they encounter in their own lives.  
Findings from the mental health literature suggest that attentional processes play a 
causal role in how children experience negative emotions (Amir, Beard, Burns & 
Bomyea, 2009; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). For example, children who more rapidly 
orient their attention to a potential threat (e.g., an angry face) are more likely to 
demonstrate social anxiety symptoms later in life – tying early individual differences in 
attention to emotion dysregulation (Pérez-Edgar, Bar-Haim, McDermott, Chronis-
Tuscano, Pine, & Fox, 2010; Schechner et al., 2012). Attention processes control whether 
evocative information is attended to initially and whether it is processed further or 
ignored (Perez-Edgar, Taber-Thomas, Auday, & Morales, 2014). Thus attention is 
believed to serve as a gateway to subsequent emotional and cognitive processing. 
Orienting attention towards an evocative stimulus (e.g., a novel toy) can increase 
children’s emotional reactivity, sustaining attention on it can maintain reactivity, averting 
gaze away from a stimulus can reduce reactivity, and withdrawing gaze completely can 
produce an inactive state (Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). Thus, attention patterns carry 
consequences for children’s emotional responding.   
A separate adult literature has also documented that people show different patterns 
of attention in response to different types of threats. For example, when presented with 
images of a fear-relevant threat, like a spider, people are faster both to notice/detect the 
threat and to disengage attention from it, compared with other types of evocative images 
(e.g., children crying). In contrast, when presented with a disgust-relevant threat like 
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vomit or feces, slower attentional disengagement has been documented (Cisler, Olatunji, 
Lohr, & Williams, 2009; Van Hooff, Devue, Vieweg, & Theeuwes, 2013). Together, this 
work suggests not only that distinct attention patterns are reflective of different types of 
emotional experiences but also that individual differences in attention within each 
emotional situation (e.g., when being presented with a fear- versus disgust-relevant 
stimulus) may relate to the intensity with which children subjectively experience that 
negative emotion. Thus, one way to understand children’s experiences of fear and disgust 
is to document the patterns of attention during emotionally challenging contexts and 
examine how these patterns relate to the intensity with which they experience disgust or 
fear. To date, no studies have compared how children’s attention differs in disgust versus 
fear contexts, nor how children’s attention patterns might relate to their experiences of 
these two threat-relevant emotions.  
Children’s patterns of attention in response to a fear or disgust elicitor and their 
individual differences in their experiences of fear and disgust should have consequences 
for development beyond the realm of mental health. For example, among adults, disgust 
sensitivity has been linked to avoidance of drinking tap water and rejection of novel 
wastewater reclamation technologies (Rozin, Haddad, Nemeroff, & Slovic, 2015; 
Schmidt, 2008). Health-related fears regarding the safety of tap water have been linked to 
recent surges in plastic bottled water sales throughout the United States (Gungor-
Demirci, Lee, Mirzaei, & Younos, 2016), suggesting that individual differences in 
fearfulness play a role in these avoidance behaviors. Some literature suggests that 
avoidance of tap water and beliefs that tap water is unsafe to drink develop early. 
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Hispanic parents report greater illness-related concerns associated with drinking tap water 
and are significantly less likely to ever offer tap water to their children within the home, 
despite its lower cost, ubiquity, and dental-health benefits for children (Hobson et al., 
2007). Hispanic and black children are, in turn, more likely to perceive a greater risk to 
drinking tap water (Onufrak et al., 2014). Among Hispanic youth, beliefs concerning 
water-fountain safety are associated with greater intake of sugary sweetened beverages at 
school (Onufrak et al., 2014) which is linked to obesity. Accumulating evidence thus 
suggests that children’s emotional reactions to tap-water usage/wastewater reclamation 
attitudes and behaviors carry consequences for their health (e.g., dental health and 
obesity) and pose an environmental/societal cost. Work that illuminates how children’s 
understanding and experiences of fear and disgust uniquely contribute to their water 
consumption attitudes and behaviors can help to refine campaigns and education 
programs aimed at increasing public acceptance of sustainable water solutions and 
healthy behaviors.   
Comparisons of fear and disgust emotional responses are rare. Empirical studies 
comparing factors that influence differential responses to fear and disgust elicitors in 
childhood, such as the understanding of the differences between these two emotions, are 
even rarer. Thus, I first summarize the separate literatures on the functions of fear and 
disgust to provide theoretical support for my claims of their dissociation. A main aim of 
the current study is to investigate the basic foundational question of whether there are 
age-related differences in the extent to which children differentiate between fear and 
disgust in childhood. I chose to focus on children across ages 4-7 because there are 
  
 
6 
 
substantial changes in cognitive abilities (e.g., attentional control, children’s 
understanding of conservation) during this period which likely influence age-related 
differences in children’s capacity to differentiate between fear and disgust.  
The extent to which children differentiate between fear and disgust should reflect 
their appraisals of the types of threats they perceive (e.g., more or less disgusting or 
scary; equally disgusting and scary). Therefore, differentiation should relate to other 
indices of children’s emotional experiences like how they direct their attention in a 
potentially threatening context and how intensely they feel fear and disgust. Thus, in the 
second section I review findings on the development of fear and disgust understanding in 
childhood. Discussion of the differences between fear and disgust and children’s 
differentiation of these two emotions should serve as a guide for understanding 
differences in children’s attentional patterns and emotional responding across disgust or 
fear relevant contexts.  
Attention patterns (e.g., orienting, disengagement) differ based on whether people 
are exposed to fear or disgust relevant photos or words suggesting that fear and disgust 
can motivate different attention patterns (Cisler, Olatunji, Lohr, & Williams, 2009; Van 
Hooff, Devue, Vieweg, & Theeuwes, 2013). Attention processes can serve as a gateway 
to subsequent emotional responding and cognition so how people’s attention is managed 
in an emotional context should also reflect individual differences in their emotions and 
thoughts (Perez-Edgar et al., 2014; Perez-Edgar et al., 2017; Raymond, Fenske, & 
Tabassoli, 2003; Todd, Cunningham, Anderson, & Thompson, 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 
2005). For example, maintaining attention on a potentially threatening item should 
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sustain or enhance negative emotions whereas withdrawing attention from the item 
should reduce negative emotions. Thus, children’s attention patterns should in general 
differ across a disgust or fear context but also, individual differences in children’s 
attention patterns (e.g., how long they look at something, how quickly they turn attention 
towards or away from it) should relate to individual differences in their emotional 
responding – the intensity and extent to which each child feels different emotions. A 
secondary aim of this dissertation was thus to compare children’s attention patterns in a 
fear or disgust-relevant context to determine whether they differ and examine whether 
they relate to children’s emotional responding. I therefore also investigated how 
individual differences in children’s attention processes in a fear or disgust context related 
to individual differences in their subjective experiences of fear and disgust. In the third 
section I therefore review research findings on attentional processes relevant to emotion 
experiences with an emphasis on what is known about how attention patterns vary in 
response to fear and disgust elicitors.  
Finally, there is growing interest in understanding how threat-relevant emotional 
responses motivate attitudes and behaviors influencing practical aspects of daily 
functioning (Lilienfeld & Latzman, 2014). In the fourth and final section I review the 
emerging literature that indicates the roles of fear and disgust in public acceptance of 
waste-water reclamation technologies and water consumption behaviors (Gungor-
Demirci, Lee, Mirzaei, & Younos, 2016; Rozin, Haddad, Nemeroff, & Slovic, 2015; 
Schmidt, 2008). I argue that the factors that influence fear and disgust responses in 
childhood should also play a role in the development of water-related preferences, 
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emotions, and beliefs. Thus, a final study aim is to examine whether the specific facets of 
children’s experiences of fear and disgust that I chose to contextualize and clarify – 
differentiation of fear and disgust, attention patterns in a disgust or fear context, and 
individual differences in the intensity of children’s fear and disgust experiences -- relate 
to children’s drinking water preferences, emotions about drinking tap water, and their 
beliefs about whether or not tap water is contaminated.  
How Do Fear and Disgust Differ?  
Fear and disgust share a negative valence but are discrete emotions. Discrete 
emotions are more than just distinct subjective feelings (e.g., feeling “disgusted” or 
“afraid”); they are triggered by distinct appraisals with relevance for different types of 
goals (Campos, Mumme, Kermoian, & Campos, 1994; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). For 
example, cues that signal a disease-carrying stimulus (e.g., a slobbering dog) appraised as 
posing a pathogenic contamination risk (e.g., bacteria transmission) threaten health-
related survival goals (e.g., illness) and evoke disgust. Stimuli that are appraised instead 
as posing a risk of immediate bodily harm (e.g., a growling dog) threaten immediate 
physical safety/survival goals (e.g., being bitten) and evoke fear. Different appraisal-goal 
connections trigger distinct patterns of coordinated responses (e.g., behavioral responses, 
expressions, cognitive processing) that result in a brief change in state– reflecting the 
experience of a discrete emotion.  
Functions of fear and disgust. Fear and disgust belong to the “basic” discrete 
emotion category in that they evolved to help organisms deal with similar types of 
commonly experienced situations and are experienced and expressed universally (Ekman, 
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1992; 1999). To maintain species survival goals, evolutionary accounts hold that discrete 
emotions were shaped by natural selection processes which fine-tuned appraisal and 
response systems so that people could adapt to different environmental circumstances and 
challenges (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009; Scherer, 2001). Fear and disgust are believed to 
have evolved in response to different predicaments – both are responses to threat, but 
threats that differ in kind. Thus, they should differ with respect to the cues that elicit them 
but there also may be some overlap in the evoked patterns of their concomitant processes 
(e.g., attentional, motivational, behavioral responding).  
Fear. Fear evolved as part of the mammalian defense system (Ohman, 2008) and 
is an adaptive response to the appraisal of an immediate, acute threat of bodily damage 
(e.g., predator, aggressive conspecifics, physical events like falling) that triggers rapid 
mobilization of the body’s resources to protect itself from physical pain and impending 
harm (Muris, 2010; Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009; Plutchik, 2003). Fear can be thought of as 
a post-stimulus reaction, a response to an already present and immediate threat in 
situations that are perceived as difficult to control (nimh.nih.gov, n.d.; Ohman, 2008; 
Rachman, 1998). In order for fear to have provided an adaptive benefit, the coordinated 
concomitant processes that accompany fear must motivate response patterns that support 
efficient escape and removing oneself from the situation – in other words, fear should 
promote harm avoidance in this type of acute, immediate threat context.  The majority of 
empirical findings suggest that fear engages responses that allow for rapid visual 
detection of threats at early stages of attention processing, and initiates rapid 
circumvention of harm through processes that engage escape and avoidance behaviors.  
  
 
10 
 
Disgust. In contrast to fear, which helps protect the body from immediate physical 
damage (e.g., tissue or organ damage), disgust appears to have initially evolved to protect 
against the threat of oral ingestion or exposure to toxic chemicals (e.g., distaste) and then 
to further protect against the threat of contaminated materials with disease/infection 
potential (Curtis, de Barra, & Aunger, 2011; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). Disgust 
protects against contact with such materials by promoting an urge to distance oneself 
from the offensive content. This can include increasing physical distance or engaging in 
hygiene behaviors to avoid contamination contact (e.g., using toilet paper, wearing 
gloves, washing hands; Oaten et al., 2009). In this way, disgust can function as a means 
of illness/disease/pathogen prevention (Porzig-Drummond, Stevenson, Case, & Oaten, 
2009). Core disgust is evoked in response to cues (e.g., rotting smell, mold, sores, mushy 
textures, colors) that specifically signal a pathogenic threat and functions to repel and 
prompt avoidance of these threats. There is general consensus that core disgust elicitors 
include body products (e.g., vomit, feces), contaminants (e.g., mud, dirt, molds) and 
small animals (e.g., maggots, cockroaches).  Some theorists also believe that death, body 
envelope violations (e.g., mutilation), contact with strangers, and hygiene disgust elicitors 
(e.g., hair) serve a pathogen avoidance function and should be considered in the core 
disgust category (Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, & DeScioli, 2013) whereas others believe 
these encompass a category of disgust elicitors known as “animal reminder disgust” that 
reflect an evolutionary broadening of disgust elicitors to include those that serve as 
reminders of our animal nature (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). Regardless of whether 
disgust in response to these types of elicitors functions to remind us of our animalistic 
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nature or minimize our contact with disease carrying stimuli, we know that children as 
young as 2-3 years of age will demonstrate behavioral avoidance of disgust elicitors that 
fall under these categories (body products, contamination, small animals, death, body 
envelope violations, stranger contact, and hygiene disgust; Stevenson et al., 2010) and I 
therefore focus on this category of disgust elicitors in this investigation. Note that 
sociomoral disgust represents a final category of moral and sex-related disgust elicitors 
that I will not examine, because this may be qualitatively different from the other disgust 
elicitor categories (Chapman & Anderson, 2012) and is not consistently present in early 
childhood.   
The distinct functions of fear and disgust suggest that fear should evoke a cascade 
of processes supporting rapid detection of visual cues and recognition that these cues 
signal an impending threat, to motivate quick behavioral responses. For example, 
detection and interpretation of sharp bared teeth as a signal of an impending attack by a 
vicious predator – a fear relevant context -- should require very little effort and happen 
almost immediately in order to promote efficient escape/avoidance of harm. Utilizing 
greater cognitive resources and time to decide whether a behavior or animal is 
predatory/aggressive or not can be incredibly costly (e.g., evolutionary fitness; processing 
an oncoming animal as a dog instead of a wolf when out hiking and failing to escape in 
time) whereas the survival cost of making rapid threat-detection decisions and 
generalizing fear-cues to other similar stimuli is low (e.g., mistakenly identifying a dog as 
a wolf when out hiking and protecting yourself is much less problematic).  
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In contrast, the threats that evoke disgust are less imminent. Disgust cues may not 
demand immediate visual detection and rapid responses to the same extent as fear cues. If 
disgust did initially serve to prevent ingestion of harmful substances, then it might be 
evolutionarily adaptive for disgust to prompt a slower behavioral response and more 
delayed, careful information processing to allow time to consider the benefits and 
consequences of engaging with the threat. For example, determining whether something 
is edible or contains a contaminated element (e.g., food can still be eaten despite a bruise 
or speck of dirt) likely requires more cognitive processing, which would prompt a more 
delayed visual disengagement and behavioral avoidance response. This added time for 
more in-depth inspection and appraisals and a cost-benefit analysis before responding 
may be beneficial for survival.  Many disgust elicitors might not result in immediate 
death but induce mild sickness, a risk that might be worth it under certain conditions 
(e.g., lack of fresh water, hunger, famine). Furthermore, greater cognitive processing 
supports the ability to recognize, identify, and recall cues that signal which substances or 
foods are safe to eat or not when encountering them again in the future. Indeed, whereas 
fear prompts response biases and an increased likelihood to classify a benign stimulus as 
threatening, disgust relates to an enhanced recognition effect for visual stimuli (Wiens, 
Peira, Golkar, & Ohman, 2008). Thus, fear and disgust are both threat-relevant emotions 
but signal different types of threats that vary along several important dimensions (e.g., 
severity of the threat, consequence of engaging with the type of threat, controllability of 
threat), and are associated with different visual attention, appraisals and behavioral 
patterns.  
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Avoidance behaviors associated with fear and disgust.  Behavioral responses to 
emotional situations can be divided into two main motivational systems, responses more 
driven by the behavioral approach system, which includes tendencies to approach/move 
towards something, and those more driven by the behavioral inhibition system, which 
includes tendencies to avoid/withdraw and move away from something (Carver, 2006; 
Gray, 1981). These approach and inhibitory motivational systems are governed by 
different underlying neurobiological circuitry (Carver, 2006) and the extent to which they 
are enacted varies across emotions (Gable, Neal, & Threadgill, 2016; Harmon-Jones, 
Price, Gable, & Peterson, 2014). Negative emotions that are accompanied by avoidance 
behaviors, like fear and disgust, prompt greater and predominant activation of the 
behavioral inhibition system (Carver, 2006; Gable, Neal, & Threadgill, 2016). In addition 
to these broad approach/inhibition motivation systems that underlie behavioral responses 
to emotions, another dimension of emotion, motivational intensity, reflects the extent to 
which the emotion evokes tendencies for action and also influences typical behavioral 
responses.  
Fear and disgust are both avoidance-related emotions (activating the behavioral 
inhibition system), but are also both high in motivational intensity in that they both 
motivate a strong tendency for avoidance actions (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010; Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). With respect to underlying motivation systems, fear is 
associated with a strong activation of the behavioral inhibition system (Carver, 2004). 
Although fear can be accompanied by freezing and attack responses, its most 
characteristic actions center on avoidance and escape behaviors, which support the goal 
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of circumventing harm (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Much less work has examined the 
extent to which behavioral inhibition systems underlie disgust although there is some 
support for their connection (Gable, Neal, & Threadgill, 2016). Few studies have 
compared activation of motivational systems or avoidance responses (e.g., increasing 
physical distance, behavioral avoidance, freezing behaviors) across fear and disgust 
contexts. Although avoidance of both disgust- and fear-eliciting stimuli is adaptive for 
survival, fear might require more rapid and extreme response actions than disgust-
relevant stimuli by nature of the different kinds of threats the stimuli pose. Thus, it is 
possible that fear would give rise to greater behavioral avoidance responses like 
increasing physical distance from evocative stimuli than does disgust.  
Children’s Understanding of Fear and Disgust  
Disgust and fear are both negative, high-intensity emotions that are evoked in 
response to a perceived threat, but a large part of what distinguishes these two negative 
emotional experiences is awareness of the type of threat posed and its ramifications (e.g., 
immediate bodily harm vs. pathogenic/contamination threat). Whereas children might 
perceive both fear and disgust elicitors as threats (e.g., something bad to avoid) – as 
demonstrated by children’s early (e.g., toddlerhood) behavioral avoidance of both fear 
and disgust elicitors (Buss & Goldsmith, 1998; Kiel & Buss, 2011; Stevenson et al., 
2010) --  findings from a broad literature suggest that a certain level of cognitive 
sophistication may be required before children can fully appreciate the nuances that 
support full-fledged awareness of how disgust differs from fear. 
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Development of fear and disgust elicitors.  The ontogeny of children’s 
appraisals of items or situations as fear or disgust evoking reflects shifts in children’s 
emotion understanding and coincides with changes in children’s cognitive development. 
These developmental patterns support the idea that a fuller understanding of fear 
develops before disgust across the transition from early to middle childhood. 
What evokes fear? Although a few studies have examined children’s behavioral 
responses to different elicitors, the majority of work on the development of typical fears 
in childhood has relied on parent-reports and child interviews (Gullone, 2000). Findings 
suggest that the ontogeny of children’s fearful responses (and then appraisals) to common 
fear elicitors corresponds to problems that children face at different maturational stages 
(Muris, 2010) beginning with those that concern physical harm/danger and are most 
evolutionarily relevant to survival.  For example, loud noises and the presence of 
strangers elicit fear responses in infancy (e.g., startle, behavioral avoidance), when 
children face developmental challenges including biological regulation, attachment with 
social partners, and object permanence. Across toddlerhood (age 2-3) as children make 
gains in locomotion and begin imaginary play, fears of animals and imaginary creatures 
develop. Thus, by three years of age children already demonstrate fear responses to 
several types of evolutionarily-relevant elicitors that signal a danger to bodily harm. In 
early childhood (~ age 3 to 6 years) increasing autonomy and self-regulation abilities 
coincide with fear of the dark and storms. And as they enter middle childhood (~ 6 to 7 
years), children’s abilities to infer causation increase, as does their ability to anticipate 
outcomes – fears of death and bodily harm by more modern threats (e.g., being hit by a 
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car, war) become more common (Burnham, 2005). Thus, fear responses to elicitors that 
pose concrete threats to bodily harm exhibit precocious development, perhaps reflecting 
implicit learning through children’s own experiences. The early emergence of fears in 
response to concrete elicitors that have immediate consequences and can be informed by 
personal experiences (e.g., pain from falling or being bitten by an animal) suggests that a 
rudimentary understanding of fear requires little cognitive processing and experience to 
learn. Across childhood, the range of fear elicitors expands, demonstrating the increasing 
role of cognitive processing to incorporate fears that are more abstract and are elicited by 
more hypothetical understanding of “what if” situations (antecedents) and consequences 
(e.g., death, for a review, see Burnham, 2005, or Gullone, 2000).  
What evokes disgust? Although infants make disgust facial expressions when 
presented with putrid smells, supporting the view of disgust as a universal, primary 
emotion (Steiner, 1979), less work has focused on the development of responses to 
disgust elicitors in childhood. Interestingly, investigations of feral humans demonstrate 
that they do not show signs of disgust (Malson, 1964/1972), implicating the role of social 
learning processes in disgust responding because if they are not taught, disgust responses 
do not appear to develop. Beyond irritant smells, which irritate chemoreceptors in the 
nose and elicit distaste, human infants also do not reject pathogenic disgust-relevant 
elicitors (e.g., feces, vomit) or avoid typical “disgust elicitors” until around 2.5 to 3 years 
of age.  
Stevenson and colleagues (2010) sought to illuminate the developmental sequence 
of disgust responses by utilizing both parent-report and behavioral methods. They divided 
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elicitors into the three main categories proposed by Rozin, Haidt, and McCauley (2008) -
- core disgust (e.g., dirt/filth and mold, stinky smells, body products like feces and vomit, 
small animals like maggots and cockroaches), animal reminder disgust (e.g., body 
envelope violations, death, hygiene), and sociomoral disgust (e.g., swearing at an elderly 
person, littering). Using parent-report assessments, the authors found that disgust 
responses to core disgust elicitors were evident by an average age of 3 years, and animal-
reminder elicitors evident by age 4, with sociomoral disgust demonstrating a protracted 
development, emerging around age 7. As well, children were shown stimuli representing 
the different categories of disgust elicitors to examine coherence between behavioral 
avoidance of these stimuli and parent-report measures (e.g., to investigate whether 
disgust responding followed the same sequence as reported by parents; core first, then 
animal, followed by sociomoral). An important finding was that the developmental 
sequence depended on the method. Disgust facial expressions suggested that core 
elicitors prompt disgust by age 2.5 and age 6.8 for animal-reminder elicitors, yet both 
core and animal-reminder elicitors prompted behavioral avoidance by age 2.5. By 
contrast, self-report measures suggested that children develop dislike for core disgust 
elicitors by age 2.5, animal elicitors by age 4.5 and sociomoral elicitors by age 6.8. Thus, 
as early as 2.5 years of age, children are demonstrating avoidance responses of disgust 
elicitors and by 6.8 years of age, children are demonstrating avoidance responses, some 
facial disgust expressions, and reporting that they dislike both core and animal-reminder 
disgust categories. This suggests that as they approach middle childhood, children appear 
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to demonstrate more complex disgust responses, supporting the idea that their 
understanding of disgust is improving.  
Understanding of fear and disgust. Emotion understanding reflects children’s 
comprehension of facial expressions and situations, awareness of what causes different 
emotions, and abilities to label, communicate, and predict one’s own and others’ 
emotions (Denham, 1986; Denham, Zoller, & Couchoud, 1994). Children’s emotion 
understanding supports their comprehension of emotion concepts (e.g., understanding 
what sadness, happiness, and fear are) which develops rapidly over childhood. Prior work 
reveals that children acquire emotion concepts in a stage-like manner (Widen, 2013). 
Emotion differentiation models suggest that children first understand emotions with 
respect to their broader dimensions such as positive vs. negative and low vs. high arousal 
(e.g., very good and very bad) but rapidly begin to differentiate between the specific 
categories of basic emotions (e.g., sadness, happiness, anger, surprise, fear, disgust) 
across the period that spans preschool to the beginning of middle childhood (Stein & 
Levine, 1989; Widen & Russell, 2008).  
Previous work with two- to five-year-old children revealed that accuracy in 
labeling facial expressions and situations evoking happiness, sadness, and anger emerges 
before accuracy for fear and disgust -- with labeling of disgust emerging latest (Widen & 
Russell, 2003). A paper that reviewed the literature on children’s emotion understanding 
suggested that accuracy in labeling fear expressions increases rapidly across ages 2 – 6 
whereas accuracy in labeling of disgust expressions increases more rapidly after age 5 
(see Widen, 2013 for a review). Thus, recognition of (and broader understanding of) 
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disgust may follow a more protracted developmental course.  In two studies, two- to five-
year-old children were told stories about made up characters describing typical causes 
and consequences of different categories of emotional experiences (walking down the 
street and being chased by a dog) and their task was to provide an emotion label for what 
the character was feeling. Children demonstrated the lowest accuracy for labeling disgust 
situations, followed by fear-relevant situations (Widen & Russell, 2010a, 2010b) 
suggesting that recognition of the situations that evoke disgust (compared to fear, anger, 
or sadness) develops last among the basic negative emotions.    
In another study, 4- to 10-year-old children were presented with either photos with 
facial expressions (e.g., a scared face) or stories that described the causes and 
consequences specific to an emotion (e.g., Fear: “Joan was walking down the street when 
a big dog started growling and chasing her. Joan screamed and ran away as fast as she 
could”) and asked to label the basic emotion that matched the facial expression or story 
(Widen & Russell, 2010). Children were more likely to correctly label fear and disgust 
specifically when presented with stories describing the antecedents and consequences of 
emotional situations, rather than the facial expressions.  This indicates that children’s 
understanding of the differences between emotions is deepening as a result of their 
developing awareness and comprehension of the antecedents and consequences of 
experiences. This understanding appears to be driven less by children’s ability to 
correctly identify cues (such as facial expressions) that signal how one should feel – a 
skill that develops later.   
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Together, the literature described above suggests that concepts of fear develop 
before concepts of disgust, and children do not begin to differentiate more fully among 
the different basic negative emotions until closer to middle childhood. Importantly, 
nuanced understanding of emotions and therefore feelings of fear and disgust requires 
understanding of the causes/antecedents and consequences of different emotional 
experiences – cognitive abilities that are developing rapidly across the transition from 
early to middle childhood (for a review see Widen, 2013). The antecedents and 
consequences of fear-relevant stimuli are relatively less complex to understand than those 
of disgust stimuli, which might be why conceptual understanding of fear appears to 
emerge earlier than disgust. For example, common fear elicitors include threats that 
represent a potential for bodily harm. The consequences (pain) can be felt immediately 
once in contact with a fear elicitor, thus learning an association between a potentially 
harmful stimulus and pain (e.g., the consequence), resulting in fear, can happen through 
one’s own personal experience (e.g., via classical and operant conditioning) and can 
develop implicitly requiring little cognitive effort or awareness (Ohman, 2008; Raio, 
Carmel, Carrasco, & Phelps, 2012).  Although early fears can also be influenced by social 
learning processes (e.g., infants use social referencing to decide whether an ambiguous 
situation is safe, Klinnert, Emde, Butterfield, & Campos, 1986), social learning 
mechanisms are not necessary for many types of typical fears to develop or for children 
to demonstrate a fear response (e.g., freezing).  
In contrast, core disgust is often evoked in response to pathogenic threats with 
less immediate harm consequences than fear (e.g., they can make you ill) and the 
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consequences of contact with a disgust-elicitor are often not immediate or visible. An 
appraisal of a disgust elicitor as serving a pathogenic threat requires a connection 
between the stimuli or disgust cue and later illness (e.g., if you ingest mold you could be 
sick hours later). Disgust might therefore require more delayed and careful processing 
(Wiens, Peira, Golkar, & Ohman, 2008) than fear to grasp its negative consequences 
(e.g., consuming a substance can result in eventual illness, slow deterioration due to 
substances that cannot be seen) and thus requires greater cognitive sophistication to 
recognize and understand what it means to be disgusting than recognizing and 
understanding what makes one afraid. Among adults, disgust facilitates significantly 
better memory recall for items than fear, which is not accounted for by response biases 
(e.g., difference is not due to false alarms), supporting the idea that disgust requires and 
promotes greater cognitive processing than fear (Chapman, Johannes, Poppenk, 
Moscovitch, & Anderson, 2013). 
Previous scholars have suggested that an adult-like feeling of disgust requires 
understanding of the antecedents of a disgusting situation and their consequences (Rozin 
& Fallon, 1987). Children therefore need to understand the concepts of contagion (e.g., 
coming in to contact with something that has germs on it can make you sick) and 
conservation of matter (e.g., germs can still be on a tissue after someone has used it even 
if they cannot actually be seen) – cognitive abilities that do not begin to come online until 
children are around 4 to 5 years of age (Hejmadi, Rozin, & Siegal, 2004; Siegal, 1988). 
This might explain why children under the age of five have difficulties differentiating 
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disgust from fear (Widen & Rusell, 2013) – in part because they do not yet have the 
cognitive capacities to comprehend conservation of matter.  
However, Stevenson and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that even children 
without understanding of contagion or conservation of matter demonstrate behavioral 
avoidance of disgust elicitors, similar to adults. Stevenson also showed that responses to 
disgust elicitors can be transmitted from mother to child and that mothers use 
exaggerated responses to disgust elicitors when with young children. Thus, children may 
demonstrate avoidance behaviors, not because they understand and appraise the items as 
“disgusting,” specifically, but because they have been socialized to think that the item is 
bad and should be avoided. It is important to point out and consider that just because 
children avoided something does not mean that they understood or were aware of the 
properties of these elicitors that made them “disgusting.”  Given the research on 
children’s development of emotion understanding described above, another plausible 
explanation could be that young children have some implicit understanding that disgust 
elicitors pose a threat and are “bad” and thus avoid them or have negative reactions to 
them, but this does not provide evidence of understanding of what it means to feel 
“disgust” specifically.  Indeed, the ontogeny of responses to disgust elicitors – first 
behavioral avoidance, then facial expressions and reported dislike – suggests that more 
full-fledged understanding of what disgust is and feels like is developing alongside 
children’s abilities to grasp conservation. Children’s understanding of contagion or 
conservation may still be necessary precursors of the full knowledge of what makes an 
item disgusting – knowledge that should help children differentiate disgusting from scary 
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items. But whether knowledge of contagion and conservation of matter is required to be 
able to understand the nuances of what makes something disgusting but not scary has not 
been tested.   
With the exception of distaste responses which are documented in infancy (e.g., a 
puckering face when a noxious substance is placed on the tongue or under the nose; 
Rosenstein & Oster, 1988), determinations of what is disgusting and behavioral reactions 
to disgust elicitors varies considerably by culture. To illustrate, some cultural groups 
create new products to distance themselves from contact with fecal matter (e.g., gloves, 
toilet paper, doggie bags) whereas others use animal feces in their construction of their 
living structures; some exterminate cockroaches whereas others eat them as food. From 
an evolutionary perspective, disgust responses likely reflect different environmental 
demands (e.g., selection pressures) that humans face across the globe (Tybur, Lieberman, 
Kurzban, & DeScioli, 2013). Implicit assessments of the cost/benefits of contact with 
potential disease-carrying stimuli influence what is considered “disgusting” across 
cultures and again suggest that sophisticated understanding of the antecedents and 
consequences of potential disease-carrying stimuli is required for a complete full-fledged 
disgust experience. For example, the idea of eating the rotting flesh of a dead animal 
(e.g., a stimulus with smell, sights, textures that signal disease potential) might evoke 
strong disgust in areas where food is bountiful but individuals who live in areas where 
food is scarce and preparing food is more difficult might care more about the nutrients 
and calories that this food source can provide and disgust is less likely to be evoked. 
Environmental circumstances thus constrain implicit cost/benefit analyses and how much 
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weight is given to the consequences of engaging with a pathogenic threat (e.g., risking 
illness from drinking dirty water vs. dying of thirst), impacting appraisals of pathogenic 
risk and what is therefore disgusting.   
Together, the above literature provides some evidence that a fuller understanding 
of what it means to feel fear vs disgust depends on children’s level of cognitive 
development. Specifically, children’s abilities to differentiate disgust from the other 
negative emotions appears to increase more rapidly after age 5. In early and middle 
childhood, children’s conceptual understanding of fear and disgust improves and should 
be reflected in the extent to which they can differentiate between the experience of these 
two threat-relevant emotions. Whether children’s understanding of contagion and 
conservation of matter are necessary precursors for differentiating between feelings of 
fear and disgust has not been examined.  
Earlier I explained how different negative emotional experiences are associated 
with different concomitant processes (e.g., attentional, motivational, behavioral). A 
question remains as to whether the extent to which children differentiate between their 
experiences of fear and disgust relates to attentional processing patterns in a fear or 
disgust context that are stereotypic of that emotion context (e.g., quicker attention 
orienting and disengagement in a fear context; slower disengagement in a disgust 
context).  
Visual Attention Processes Relevant to Emotional Responding  
A main goal of this dissertation is to investigate how children’s attention patterns 
vary across fear and disgust contexts and relate to their emotional responses. Attention is 
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considered the gateway to further emotional and cognitive responding because attention 
controls what information is selected for further processing (e.g., stored in memory, 
learning) and thus also what is ignored (Perez-Edgar et al., 2014; Perez-Edgar et al., 
2017; Raymond, Fenske, & Tabassoli, 2003; Todd, Cunningham, Anderson, & 
Thompson, 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Because fear and disgust signal different 
types of threats, attention processing for each emotion context should be specific, to 
allow responses that are most adaptive for each threat. Indeed, findings from several 
studies suggest differences in attention patterns within fear and disgust contexts.  
Attention orienting processes in fear and disgust. Two attention-related 
processes that carry consequences for emotional responding and have been shown to 
differ in response to fear versus disgusting stimuli are attention orienting (directing 
attention towards a target stimulus) and disengagement (the ability to disengage attention 
from a target stimulus), which differ across fear and disgust emotion contexts.  
Fear. People show rapid tendencies to associate threat-relevant stimuli like 
snakes and spiders with fear (DeLoache & LoBue, 2009; LoBue & DeLoache, 2008), and 
an automatic bias to orient attention more quickly to these types of threat-relevant 
information, thus exhibiting shorter latencies to fixate attention on a fear-relevant 
stimulus (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008, LoBue, Rakison, & DeLoache, 2010). Snakes and 
spiders are both agentic threats that have the potential to puncture skin, causing bodily 
damage, and thus pose an immediate threat to survival. This faster detection of fear-
related content is in line with the view that fear instantiates processes that support rapid 
responding to promote survival in threat-relevant situations and is in line with empirical 
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work demonstrating that fearful expressions enhance visual sensory processing. More 
rapid attention orienting, allowing quick detection of fear-relevant stimuli would suggest 
that fear elicitors are processed more rapidly and require less effort to assess the threat 
they pose.  
Using an innovative computer-based visual search task, LoBue (2009, 2010) 
found that both adults and young children display more rapid attention orienting (and 
thus detection) of various categories of fear-relevant stimuli. LoBue (2009) presented 5-
year-old children and adults with a 3x3 array of emotional faces. On each screen, 
participants were instructed to find a target face (e.g., angry and thus threat-relevant) 
among 8 distractor faces (e.g., neutral, sad, happy). She found that all ages demonstrated 
faster detection of threat-relevant target angry and frightening faces than less threat-
relevant happy or sad faces, thus suggesting faster attentional orienting to threat-relevant 
stimuli in early childhood. Findings were replicated in other studies utilizing other stimuli 
that pose evolutionary threats, revealing that even preschoolers show superior attention 
orienting to target snakes (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008) than threat-irrelevant targets.  
This facilitated attention orienting is also typical when detecting spiders (LoBue, 
2010). In one study, preschool aged children and adults were presented with a similar 3x3 
array involving spiders, cockroaches, and mushrooms. Findings suggest that attention 
orienting to spiders is more rapid than orienting to both cockroaches and mushrooms, for 
which reaction times did not differ. This last part is particularly interesting, as 
cockroaches are often included as disgust-relevant stimuli but in this study were not 
categorized as such. So, this finding might also suggest that whereas fear-relevant stimuli 
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are attended to and thus detected more quickly, even in early childhood -- this rapid 
detection might not be true for disgust-relevant stimuli.  
Disgust. Parallel to fear-related stimuli, other work using a computerized Stroop 
color naming task suggests that disgust-relevant information might also evidence biased 
attention. After priming students with disgust, threat, or neutral stories, Charash and 
McKay (2002) presented them with disgust (e.g., vomit), threat (e.g., fear, coma, tumor) 
and neutral words (pedal, moonlit). Participants were asked to match the color of the 
presented words (5 different options—red, blue, green, brown, and purple) by responding 
to buttons of different colors on a keyboard. Students demonstrated longer latencies to 
respond to the word’s color when presented with disgust words than neutral words. 
Latencies for responding to fear and disgust words did not differ, yet people were not 
slower to respond to the fear words than neutral words. Thus, the authors concluded that 
findings indicate the presence of an attentional bias for disgust-related words. Yet, it is 
important to point out that some of the fear-related stimuli used in this study could also 
prompt disgust (e.g., tumor) and, in contrast to LoBue’s visual search tasks, which 
present visually threatening stimuli, the stroop relies on semantic attention (e.g., the 
meaning of the words) which likely taps attention processes beyond orienting. 
Furthermore, the longer latencies to respond when disgust-relevant words were presented 
likely reflects a difficulty disengaging attention from the emotional content associated 
with the meaning of disgust words and not faster orienting.  
Attention disengagement processes in fear and disgust. The research described 
above suggests that attentional resources are allocated towards faster detection (e.g., 
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orienting) of fear-related than disgust-related threat relevant images and opens the 
possibility that disgust holds attention longer than fear. Van Hooff, Devue, Vieweg, and 
Theeuwes (2013) sought to specifically compare attentional disengagement from fear and 
disgust related images. Participants were asked to respond to a target that appeared 
around a central fear, disgust, or neutral image. By varying the presentation time between 
onset of the central image and target (200, 500, 800, and 1100 ms), the authors 
determined that participant reaction times to the fastest targets (200 ms) were longer after 
disgust images. These findings suggest that disgust facilitates slower attentional 
disengagement than fear images, yet this still occurs at very early stages of attention 
processing. The authors explained the lack of fear-related disengagement effect by 
suggesting that for the disgust images, further attentional resources were needed to fully 
assess the threat posed by the stimuli, whereas fear-related threat processing is more rapid 
and requires less effort.  
In sum, fear is associated with more rapid orienting (e.g., shorter latencies to 
orient attention) and shifting of attention toward threat and quicker disengagement from 
threat, whereas disgust is associated with slower disengagement of attention, supporting 
the different functions of fear and disgust. To date I know of no studies that have 
compared attentional processing across fear and disgust contexts in childhood. 
Furthermore, the majority of studies have utilized computer-based paradigms and 
examine attention processes at early stages of visual processing. Therefore, a question 
remains as to whether or not these differences in attention processes would be 
documented in response to exposure to disgust- or fear-relevant stimuli in real life.  
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Attention Processes Relevant to Individual Differences in Emotion Experiences  
Although the above research findings suggest that different emotions draw 
different patterns of attentional processing, a substantial body of research also 
demonstrates that individual differences in how people attend to emotion-related stimuli 
or information also has significant influences on emotional responding (Van Bockstaele 
et al., 2014).  
Individuals with anxiety-related disorders believed to be the result of dysregulated 
fear systems demonstrate distorted attentional processing of emotional content in that 
they are even faster to detect threat-relevant information and slower to disengage 
attention from it than people without disorder (Ohman, 2008) – linking dysregulated 
attentional and emotional responding together (e.g., exaggerated or inappropriate fear 
responses). Furthermore, modulating these abnormal attention tendencies produces 
decreases in stress reactivity and anxiety symptoms (Bar-Haim, 2010; Hakamata et al., 
2010; MacLeod & Clarke, 2015), illustrating that controlling attention can alter 
emotional reactivity. According to theoretical models, deployment of attentional 
resources which encompass distraction strategies and the ability to direct attention 
towards or away from emotional content is a primary component of the emotion 
regulation process (Gross, 1998). A broad literature therefore supports the control of 
visual attention as an important component of emotion regulation -- the set of processes 
by which people change the experience, timing, duration, and expression of emotions 
(Gross & Thompson, 2007; Mauss et al., 2007) to support their goals (Koole, 2009). 
Thus, findings across different literatures support the notion that attention serves as a 
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gateway to emotional processing and thus, individual differences in attention in an 
emotional context should relate to individual differences in children’s emotional 
experiences.  
Developmental changes in attention processes should relate to children’s 
emotional experiences. Eye gaze is connected to early emotional responding (Sheese, 
Rothbart, Posner, White, & Fraundorf, 2008). Children’s abilities to orient their attention 
towards internally motivated stimuli (e.g., goals) develops rapidly in infancy (Colombo, 
2001). Orienting attention towards an evocative stimulus can increase emotional 
reactivity, sustaining attention can maintain reactivity, averting gaze away from a 
stimulus can reduce reactivity, and complete withdrawal of gaze can produce an inactive 
state (Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). Thus, children’s abilities to control their visual 
attention and direct it towards or away from stimuli that are personally salient develops 
very quickly in early life, and attention to emotional stimuli carries consequences for 
emotional responding.  
At ages 3-4, children still make use of orienting attention networks but attentional 
processes become more strongly influenced by the executive control of attention 
(Rothbart, Sheese, Rueda, & Posner, 2011) which allows for conflict resolution among 
sources competing for attention. Executive functioning skills like working memory, 
cognitive flexibility, goal setting, and planning that develop rapidly across childhood and 
underlie self-regulation (Anderson, 2002) coincide with this enhanced executive 
attention. Although the executive control of attention continues to strengthen until early 
adulthood, certain executive attention skills like conflict inhibition evidence substantial 
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growth across early childhood (3 to 5 years) and up until middle childhood (~ age 7; 
Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2004; 2005). Conflict inhibition encompasses the ability to 
resolve attentional conflict when presented with stimuli that conflict or compete for 
attentional resources (Rothbart, Posner, & Rueda, 2005). Conflict inhibition therefore 
reflects competencies in sustaining attention on stimuli that are in-line with internal goals 
and ignoring stimuli that are not. By age 7, children’s conflict inhibition performance 
begins to mirror adult performance which suggests a dramatic shift in how attentional 
resources are allocated and reflects a strengthening of control processes that support self-
regulation (Rothbart & Rueda, 2005). Executive attentional control abilities like 
inhibiting distracting emotional information to pursue a task (e.g., learn in a classroom or 
complete an assignment) are important for appropriate, healthy emotional responding. In 
childhood, greater executive control of attention is linked to lower levels of negative 
emotionality (Rothbart, 2011). Interestingly, the initial age of onset for many types of 
anxiety related disorders that are believed to have their roots in dysregulated fear and 
disgust responding (e.g., phobias, separation anxiety), is 7 years of age (Kessler et al., 
2007). This work suggests that children’s attention profiles before this middle childhood 
period might work to shape trajectories of subsequent emotional responding.   
Applications: Rejection of Tap Water  
 Individual differences in children’s responses to fear and disgust-relevant 
stimuli should carry far-reaching consequences for developmental science. Threat-
relevant emotions are powerful motivators of attitudes and behaviors in general and the 
way fear and disgust elicitors are felt and managed underlies differences in important 
  
 
32 
 
aspects of everyday life, such as adults’ hygiene behaviors, political ideologies and moral 
thinking (Banks & Hicks, 2015; Curtis, De Barra, & Aunger, 2011; Haidt, 2003; 
Lilienfeld & Latzman, 2014; Liu, Lin, Xu, Zhang, & Luo, 2015; Royzman, Cusimano, & 
Leeman, 2017; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Prinz, 2007). In particular, an expanding literature 
suggests that fear and disgust underlie people’s attitudes towards water reuse schemes 
and technologies and relate to whether or not they accept or reject the use or consumption 
of recycled and tap water in the home (Massoud, Kazarian, Alameddine, & Al-Hindi, 
2018; McLeod, Bharadwaj, & Waldner, 2015; Wester, Timpano, Cek, & Broad, 2016). 
Feelings of disgust and greater concerns that tap water is contaminated and can lead to 
illness are linked to stronger rejection and avoidance of tap water and beliefs that tap 
water is bad (McLeod et al., 2015; Rozin, Haddad, Nemeroff, & Slovic, 2015; Wester et 
al., 2016). Furthermore, fears of illness or concerns over the health risks of drinking tap 
water are also related to rejection of water reuse solutions and contribute to consumer 
preferences for bottled water (Doria, 2006; Friedler et al. 2006; Gungor-Demirci, Lee, 
Mirzaei, & Younos, 2016; Massoud, Kazarian, Alameddine, & Al-Hindi, 2018), 
suggesting that fears play a role in recycled water-related beliefs and consumption 
behaviors.  
The literature to date therefore suggests a role of fear and disgust in the perception 
that recycled/reused water poses a threat and explains in large part why people reject 
more efficient, cost-effective methods for generating potable water. Thus, individual 
differences in people’s threat-relevant emotions limits the practical application of safe 
and sustainable water efficiency and conservation schemes, creating a societal problem. 
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The world’s supply of potable fresh water is dwindling. Municipal tap-water systems in 
the United States are considered some of the safest in the world and provide sustainable 
drinking water solutions to the public (Gungor-Demirci, Lee, Mirzaei, & Younos, 2016). 
Despite this, bottled water sales within the past decade have soared (Hu, Morton, & 
Mahler, 2011). Water bottling from fresh water sources and sales of bottled water 
continue, even in regions experiencing severe drought (e.g., Arrowhead in California) 
massively contributing towards the world’s plastic waste problem. Fear and disgust have 
therefore separately been linked to concerns of illness over drinking reused/recycled 
water, rejection of water reuse schemes, avoidance of tap water consumption, and the 
decision to consume bottled water instead, suggesting that feelings of fear or disgust 
towards recycled water pose an environmental threat. Furthermore, there are individual 
differences in the extent to which people accept or reject recycled water. Some people are 
okay drinking tap water, others are okay drinking tap water after engaging in some water 
treatment/hygiene behaviors such as using at-home filtration systems, and still a portion 
of people completely refuse and are unwilling to consume tap water (for reviews, see Po, 
Kaercher & Nancarrow, 2003; Russell & Lux, 2006).  The extent to which people 
completely rely on bottled water for consumption, the extent of their illness related 
concerns over drinking tap water, the intensity of their negative emotions towards 
thoughts of drinking tap water, and the extent to which they are okay with drinking tap 
water after some filtering (or not) are all likely related to individual differences in how 
people experience fear and disgust. To date, I know of no studies that have examined how 
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both individual differences in disgust and fear relate to concerns about the safety of 
drinking tap water and drinking water preferences.  
As well, little is known about how and when children’s concerns about drinking 
tap water or their preferences for bottled water develop, and whether they are related to 
early differences in children’s understanding and experiences of fear and disgust. It is 
important to clarify children’s beliefs about the safety of drinking tap water, because 
illness-related concerns about tap water are linked to water consumption behaviors 
among children from lower-income, minority families (Hobson et al., 2007), posing a 
public health issue. Black and Hispanic and lower income youth (ages 9 – 19) are more 
likely to report greater health concerns about tap water (Onufrak et al., 2014). Among 
Hispanic youth, greater negative emotions about tap water are linked to greater 
consumption of sugary beverages (Onufrak et al., 2014), which is in turn linked to 
obesity (Bogart et al., 2013). Less research has sought to understand whether young 
children also demonstrate these beliefs about tap water and whether their developing 
beliefs are linked to their understanding and experiences of fear and disgust. Determining 
whether tap water avoidance is more strongly related to fear or disgust reactions and 
when these associations and preferences for bottled water emerge in childhood can 
pinpoint which concerns and emotions to target in educational campaigns aimed at 
improving children’s tap-water acceptance – and at what ages to introduce these types of 
programs to encourage sustainable water-related beliefs as they develop.  
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The Current Study 
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to improve understanding of children’s 
experiences of low intensity fear and disgust – emotions children are likely to experience 
often in daily life that should carry consequences for how they feel, think about, and 
respond to potential threats in the real world. The conceptual model I have developed 
posits children’s understanding of these two negative emotions to be measurably 
different, as are the patterns with which they orient their attention towards or away from 
fear and disgust elicitors. The elements of emotion understanding and attentional 
processes that are the focus of this dissertation thus reflect underlying differences in how 
children experience fear and disgust. These correlates of emotional experience in early 
and middle childhood should carry consequences for everyday beliefs and behaviors 
across multiple settings of their lives (e.g., at home, at school), such as children’s 
rejection of tap water and preferences for bottled water. An investigation of these 
interrelations is especially crucial in middle childhood, because symptoms of disorders 
that are linked to irrational contamination and illness related beliefs (e.g., obsessive 
compulsive disorders and phobias) first onset around age 7 (Kessler et al., 2007). So, 
children’s early understanding of and attention to fear and disgust may relate to 
developing beliefs about real-world concerns like water consumption. In turn, these 
emerging beliefs may carry critical long-term health consequences for children across 
development (e.g., chronic dehydration, risk for obesity, dental decay), emphasizing the 
importance of understanding experiences of fear and disgust in the years leading up to 
middle childhood.  
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My first aim focused on clarifying children’s fear and disgust understanding by 
documenting individual differences in their differentiation of fear and disgust -- the 
extent to which children demonstrate an awareness that these two emotions are different. 
Specifically, I asked whether children’s differentiation of fear and disgust in early to 
middle childhood was related to (a) age, (b) their understanding of contagion and 
conservation of matter (competencies believed to underly full-fledged disgust 
experiences), and/or (c) individual differences in children’s responses to fear and disgust 
experiences. Ages of the sample spanned 4 to 7 years to bridge the transition from early 
to middle childhood. By age 5, children demonstrate good accuracy in their ability to 
differentiate situations and facial expressions of fear from other negative emotions like 
sadness and anger, and after age 5 children’s accuracy in differentiating disgust from 
other negative emotions in recognition tasks improves linearly (Widen & Russell, 
2010a,b; Widen, 2013). Yet, children do not demonstrate coherent disgust responses 
across multiple emotion channels (e.g., facial expressions, affective liking/disliking, and 
behavioral avoidance) until around age 7 (Stevenson et al., 2010). Thus, the older 
children in this sample were expected to demonstrate greater differentiation between fear 
and disgust. But, prior theoretical work suggests that a full-fledged experience of disgust 
requires an understanding of contagion and conservation (Hejmadi, Rozin, & Siegal, 
2004; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Siegal, 1988). These concepts might be pre-requisites for 
being able to distinguish between what it means to feel fear and disgust or even 
understand when people would feel disgust (e.g., pathogenic threat potential) vs. fear 
(e.g., immediate pain/bodily harm potential). Thus, above and beyond children’s 
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biological age, their understanding of contagion and contamination should be associated 
with the extent to which they differentiate between feelings of fear and disgust. In 
addition, whether or not emotion differentiation related to individual differences in the 
intensity of children’s subjective emotional responses to fear and disgust has not been 
investigated and was explored.  
Finally, my research methodology allowed me to test two other research questions 
which to my knowledge have not otherwise been investigated. Children completed a 
standard fear interview (the Koala Fear Questionnaire, KFQ; Muris et al., 2003) and a 
standard disgust interview (the Disgust Emotion Scale for Children, DES-C; Muris, 
Huijding, Mayer, Langkamp, Reyhan, & Olatunji, 2012) but I modified both so that for 
each item children rated the intensity with which they felt both fear and disgust. This 
design element allowed me to test whether children differentiate between fear and disgust 
more strongly when presented with items that are traditionally “fear” evoking compared 
to items that are traditionally “disgust” evoking. In addition to asking children about 
whether hypothetical elicitors made them feel scared and disgusted via interview, I also 
presented children with 10 potentially threatening items in person (e.g., a needle, spider, 
blood, moldy bread) and asked them to rate how disgusted or scared each made them 
feel. This added element allowed me to compare children’s differentiation of fear and 
disgust for hypothetical items from the interviews versus in-person potential threat 
stimuli -- two contexts that varied in terms of the imminence of the potential threat.  
My second aim was to examine whether attentional processes during emotional 
contexts (e.g., orienting, sustained attention, and disengagement during fear and disgust 
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episodes) (a) varied by the specific emotion that characterized the context, and (b) related 
to individual differences in emotion differentiation and experience. Prior work provides 
some evidence that attention processes vary across fear and disgust emotion contexts 
(Charash & McKay, 2002; Van Hooff, Devue, Vieweg, & Theeuwes, 2013). Attention 
has also been linked to underlying differences in children’s emotional experiences 
(Pérez-Edgar, Bar-Haim, McDermott, Chronis-Tuscano, Pine, & Fox, 2010; Schechner et 
al., 2012). Thus, attention processes should play a prominent role in children’s responses 
to different emotion elicitors and how they experience emotions. Children demonstrate 
rapid detection of threat-relevant stimuli (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008). Findings from 
work utilizing computer paradigms suggest that fear is associated with rapid attention 
orienting (e.g., shorter latencies to orient attention) and shifting (e.g., quicker attentional 
disengagement) whereas disgust has been associated with a slower attentional 
disengagement than fear (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008; Van Hooff, Devue, Vieweg, & 
Theeuwes, 2013). Together, this work suggests that different attention patterns would be 
expected when comparing a fear and disgust context. To my knowledge, no prior 
research has investigated whether key components of children’s attention (e.g., orienting, 
sustained attention, disengagement) vary across a scary versus disgusting context. 
I also investigated how children’s attention patterns (e.g., attention orienting, 
sustaining attention, disengaging attention) related to their differentiation and experiences 
(via reported intensity and behavioral avoidance) of fear and disgust. Work with phobic 
adults suggests that dysregulated fear is associated with even faster orienting biases to 
threat-relevant information (Ohman, 2008). Work on attention regulation suggests that 
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sustaining attention on a negative stimulus can increase or maintain negative emotional 
intensity and withdrawing attention can extinguish it (Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). 
Thus, latencies to orient attention should relate to individual differences in the 
experiences of emotion (e.g., intensity and avoidance behaviors) as should the length of 
overall fixation duration (e.g., sustained attention), and the latencies to disengage 
attention. Although attention processes should relate to emotional experiences, whether 
specific components of attention are more strongly related to individual differences in the 
experience of disgust or fear has not been tested and was explored.  
The third aim of this dissertation was to determine whether these three aspects of 
emotion development – differentiation reflecting nuanced emotion understanding, 
attention processes reflecting the extent to which emotional content is processed, and 
individual differences in the intensity with which children experience fear and disgust – 
have implications for children’s beliefs about threats they encounter in everyday life. To 
my knowledge, no work has tested how these factors might relate to beliefs about the 
suitability of consuming tap water in childhood. Water consumption behaviors carry 
public and environmental health consequences and some research, most of which has 
been done with adults, suggests that consumption behaviors and water preferences may 
be tied to people’s concerns that tap water is contaminated. Furthermore, prior 
researchers have theorized that whether children comprehend contagion and conservation 
of matter underlies their understanding of disgust and carries consequences for water-
related beliefs. Thus, children who understand contagion or conservation of matter would 
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be more likely to prefer bottled water and believe that tap water can make you sick (e.g., 
it is contaminated).  
Work with adults has linked rejection of recycled water solutions and purchases 
of bottled water to experiences of threat-relevant emotions like fear and disgust 
(Massoud, Kazarian, Alameddine, & Al-Hindi, 2018; McLeod, Bharadwaj, & Waldner, 
2015; Wester, Timpano, Cek, & Broad, 2016). I therefore sought to test whether and to 
what extent different facets of children’s emotional development (differentiation, 
attention, and subjective experience) predicted their drinking water preferences (e.g., tap 
vs. bottled water), emotions about drinking tap water, and beliefs that tap water is 
contaminated.  
In this study, children were interviewed about the subjective intensity of their fear 
and disgust experiences, their understanding of contagion and conservation, and their 
water-related consumption preferences, emotions and contamination beliefs. Children 
participated in a novel free-play task with a potential threat -- either an evocative 
disgusting (dirty trash can) or scary (roaring dinosaur) stimulus -- while aspects of their 
attention were measured. Children were also presented with a series of evocative stimuli 
in person and the intensity of their feelings of fear and disgust as well as their approach 
behaviors towards these stimuli were assessed.  
Hypotheses 
Research question 1: Are there age-related differences in children’s 
differentiation of fear and disgust?  
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Hypothesis 1 a) I predicted that age would be positively correlated with greater 
differentiation between disgusting and scary stimuli, demonstrating more sophisticated 
emotion understanding with increasing age.  
Hypothesis 1 b) I predicted that the extent to which children differentiate between 
fear and disgust would relate to their understanding of both contagion and conservation, 
such that children who demonstrated understanding of contagion or understanding of 
conservation would show greater differentiation. I also explored whether these predicted 
associations would hold, partialling age.  
Though I had no other specific hypotheses for this research question, I also 
explored 1 c) whether the extent to which children differentiated between fear and disgust 
related to individual differences in the intensity with which they experienced disgust or 
fear; and 1 d) whether children’s differentiation of fear and disgust when presented with 
standard “fear” items substantially differed from their differentiation of fear and disgust 
when presented with standard “disgust” items. Finally, I explored 1 e) whether the extent 
to which children differentiated between fear and disgust in a hypothetical interview task 
differed from the extent to which they differentiated between fear and disgust when 
presented with fear/disgust relevant items in person.  
Research Question 2: Do attention patterns vary across fear and disgust contexts or 
relate to children’s emotional responding?    
Hypothesis 2 a) I predicted that children would demonstrate different attention 
patterns depending on the emotion context. Compared to children in the disgust context 
(the free-play with the garbage can), I expected that children in the fear context (the free-
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play with the dinosaur) would more quickly orient their attention to the novel stimulus 
and demonstrate a shorter first fixation period (i.e., a shorter duration of their first look 
towards the evocative stimulus), suggesting quicker disengagement.  
I explored 2 b) whether children would fixate on the novel stimulus for differing 
lengths of time in the disgust or fear context (sustaining attention).  
Hypothesis 2 c) I expected that for children in the fear context, a pattern of 
attention that is typically exhibited in response to fear elicitors – faster attention orienting 
(shorter latencies to orient attention towards the evocative stimuli) and quicker attentional 
disengagement (shorter first fixation period) would relate to greater differentiation of fear 
from disgust. For children in the disgust context, I expected that faster orienting of 
attention towards the evocative stimuli and slower disengagement from the evocative 
stimuli, which are characteristic of attention patterns in response to a disgust elicitor, 
would predict greater differentiation of fear from disgust.  
I additionally explored 2d) the relative contributions of each attention component 
in explaining the variance in children's emotion differentiation.  
Hypothesis 2e) Regardless of condition, I predicted that children who more 
quickly oriented to the evocative stimulus would report greater intensity of felt fear and 
disgust and avoidance of the evocative items presented to them. Similarly, children who 
sustained attention on the evocative stimulus longer or were slower to disengage 
attention from the stimulus would report greater intensity of felt emotion as well as 
demonstrate avoidance. In contrast, I predicted that longer latencies to first orient 
attention, a shorter duration of sustained visual attention, or quicker attentional 
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disengagement from the evocative stimulus would relate to lower reported fear and 
disgust intensity and greater behavioral avoidance.  
I also explored 2 f) the relative contributions of each attention component in 
explaining the variance in children’s subjective experiences of fear and disgust.  
Research question 3: Do aspects of children’s emotional development relate to their 
water-related preferences, emotions, and beliefs?  
I explored 3 a) whether the extent to which children differentiated between fear 
and disgust related to their drinking water preferences, negative emotions about tap 
water, and beliefs that tap water is contaminated (e.g., it can make you sick).  
Hypothesis 3 b) Regardless of condition, I predicted that attention patterns from 
the free play context that are characteristic of more exaggerated negative emotional 
responding -- quicker attention orienting towards the evocative stimuli, or greater overall 
attention sustained on the evocative stimuli, or slower attentional disengagement -- would 
relate to greater preferences for bottled water, greater negative emotions towards drinking 
tap water, and the belief that tap water is contaminated.  
Hypothesis 3 c) I also predicted that children who reported more intense 
experiences of fear or disgust or demonstrated fewer approach behaviors when in the 
presence of potentially threatening stimuli would report greater preferences for bottled 
water, greater negative emotions about drinking tap water, and believe that tap water can 
make people sick.  
I explored 3 d) whether individual differences in reported fear or disgust intensity 
more strongly related to children’s water-related preferences, emotions, and beliefs but 
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because very little work has compared how fear and disgust influence behaviors, I 
advanced no specific hypotheses about these associations.   
Methods  
Participants 
Sixty-nine mother-child dyads participated in a single 2.5-hour session at the 
Emotion Regulation Lab as part of a larger study of children’s emotion development. 
Children (35 girls) ages 4 to 7 years (4.245 – 7.749 years: Mage = 5.999; SD = .962) 
visited the lab with their mother. The larger study from which this sample was drawn 
tests specific questions about the nature of mother-child emotion socialization processes, 
thus only mother-child dyads participated (Brand & Klimes Dougan, 2010; Shewark & 
Blandon, 2015). For compensation, mothers received $25 and children selected a small 
toy prize.  
A priori power analysis using G*Power suggested that a sample size of 49 
participants was needed to detect a moderate effect size of 80% power and an α = .05 
with the planned multiple regression analyses (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). 
Published findings from previous ambulatory eye-tracking work with children of a 
similar age range that also examined the effect of a dichotomous predictor (e.g., two 
groups) on different indices of attention using linear multiple regression reported an 
observed R2 = .25, and this effect size was used as the basis for my power analyses (Fu, 
Nelson, Borge, Buss, & Perez-Edgar, 2019). As well, I conducted a power analysis based 
on a two-tailed independent samples t-test comparison of two group means (children 
assigned to the fear or disgust free-play conditions) with alpha = .05 and power = .80, 
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which indicated that a sample size of 29 children per group would be needed to detect 
mean differences of medium-to-large effect sizes (Cohen, 2003). Thus, I likely had 
adequate power to test the hypothesized associations of interest in this dissertation.  
My sample reflected the ethnic and socioeconomic diversity of the surrounding 
Inland Empire region. Children’s race was reported as Hispanic (30.4%), Caucasian 
(23.2%), Black (5.8%), Asian (1.4%) and Multiracial (37.7%). Race for one child was 
reported as “other”. Reported annual family incomes ranged from less than $5,000 to 
above $200,000. Roughly 25% of the sample reported an annual family income of less 
than $35,000 and 5% reported family income above $100,000. Roughly 50% of the 
sample reported an annual family income of $60,000 or less. Approximately 20% of 
mothers completed high school or had less education, 27.5% of mothers had graduated 
from college, and 23.2% had completed some graduate training or had more education. 
Fathers’ education was reported by mothers; roughly 52.2% were reported as having 
completed high school or less education, 14.5% had graduated from college, and ~16% 
completed some graduate training or more education. Because this study incorporated 
eye-tracking methodologies to track visual attention processes, children who wore glasses 
or who were diagnosed with developmental disabilities or attention deficit disorders were 
not eligible for participation.  
Design 
This study employed a between-subjects design to test primary attention 
differences across scary and disgusting novel free-play tasks. Dyads were randomly 
assigned to one of the two experimental conditions (disgust or fear free-play) with the 
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restriction that an approximately even number of girls and boys of similar ages were 
assigned to each.  
Procedure 
The study was approved by the university’s institutional review board. Mother-
child dyads visited the UCR Emotion Regulation lab one time for the study. Upon arrival 
to the lab, mothers provided written consent and children provided their assent to 
participate. The entire visit was video-recorded for later offline coding. The full 
procedures for the study are presented in Appendix A, but see Appendix B for the subset 
of procedures that are the focus of this dissertation. 
Emotion intensity rating training. First, children received training on self-
reporting their emotions using 3 separate 4-point cartoon face scales that asked about 
fear, disgust, and happiness. These scales were used throughout the visit during 
interviews to capture children’s intensity of fear and disgust. The “scared” and “happy” 
scales have been used in prior work with children of similar ages, but the “grossed out or 
disgusted” scale was created in a similar style for this study (Davis, Parsafar, Quinones-
Camacho, & Shih, 2017; Parsafar & Davis, 2018; see Appendix C for face scales). The 
scales for fear, disgust, and happiness each began with a neutral face followed by 3 faces 
of increasing emotional intensity (1= not at all/neutral, 2 = a little, 3= pretty much, 4 = 
very). Children saw each scale one at a time while the experimenter explained the 
anchors (See Appendix D for exact procedure). Only the “scared” and “grossed out or 
disgusted” scales were used here.  
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Children were also asked if they understood what “grossed out” or “disgusted” 
meant. If not, the researcher provided an example (e.g., “it’s like if something makes you 
feel eww and yucky, like throw up or poo poo”) and switched to using either the term 
“icky” or “yucky” throughout the entire visit whenever disgust emotion ratings were 
collected (e.g., not at all icky, a little icky, pretty much icky, very icky). Then, children 
were given a comprehension check question for each face scale to ensure they understood 
the scale and how to report their emotion intensity (e.g., “which face would you point to 
if you felt A LITTLE scared?”). If participants responded incorrectly, each anchor of the 
scale was explained again and they were given another practice question. This was 
repeated until children successfully answered the comprehension check. Children who 
demonstrated initial difficulty with the scales (e.g., pointed to the wrong face during the 
practice question) were also asked to say their anchor response out loud as they reported 
their emotions throughout the visit (e.g., they were asked to say “not at all scared” as they 
pointed to the not at all scared face) and scoring was based on the verbal response they 
provided to ensure that younger children’s subjective reported emotional experience was 
captured, even if they may have had difficulties with navigating the face scales.  
Fear and disgust sensitivity interviews. Next, using the emotion scales, children 
rated the intensity with which a number of common fear or disgust elicitors made them 
feel both fear and disgust. Specifically, children were interviewed about items from the 
Koala Fear Questionnaire (KFQ; Muris et. al., 2003) and the Disgust Emotion Scale for 
Children (DES-C; Muris, Huijding, Mayer, Langkamp, Reyhan & Olatunji, 2012). These 
ratings were used to assess the intensity with which children reported subjective 
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experiences of fear and disgust. The correlations between the fear and disgust ratings for 
each of these scales were also later used to calculate an emotion differentiation score.  
The KFQ is a 31-item measure designed to assess 4- to 12-year-old children’s 
fearfulness in response to top fear elicitors in childhood. Children see a cartoon image of 
each item and rate the intensity with which the item makes them feel fearful on a scale of 
1-3 scale and the scores across all items were summed to compute a total.  Higher total 
scores represent greater fearfulness – more intense feelings of fear (see Appendix E for a 
list of items). Note that although the original measure comes with a 1-3 koala cartoon 
face scale, for consistency across the interview measures I had children report their 
emotions to the KFQ items using the face scales used by our lab.  
The DES-C (Muris et al., 2012) is a 30-item measure designed to assess 8- to 12-
year-old children’s disgust sensitivities to core disgust elicitors across five domains: 
animals, body violations, rotting foods, death, and odors. Each item is rated on a 5-point 
scale (0 = no disgust at all ; 4 = extreme disgust) and scores are summed so that higher 
total scores indicate more intense feelings of disgust (see Appendix F for a full list of the 
items).  
I made four changes to these original measures: First, because I originally planned 
to combine children’s ratings from the KFQ and DES-C to create total fear and total 
disgust intensity scores, I asked a research assistant to create cartoon black and white 
sketches to accompany each item/situation in the DES-C to parallel how the KFQ is 
presented (see Appendix F). Second, I adjusted some language in the DES-C to be more 
age-appropriate for younger children (e.g., “handling an injection needle” was changed to 
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“handling (or holding) an injection needle, like the kind a nurse uses”). Third, for all 
items across the two measures, I asked children to report the intensity with which they 
would feel fear as well as disgust, using the four-point emotion rating scales from our lab 
to assess this. Fourth, based on published psychometric papers on these two validated 
questionnaires and in order to shorten the length of this task, I omitted several items. For 
the KFQ these were items that did not correlate well with the total score on the scale 
(e.g., dogs, chickens, birds, and telling something in front of the class). For the DES-C I 
omitted items that loaded onto the “odors” factor/domain because my interest was 
specific to associations between visual attention processes and fearfulness/disgust 
sensitivity. An exception to this was “the smell of throw-up” (original was “the smell of 
vomit”) which also loaded onto the body violation domain. One additional DES-C item 
that did not load onto any factor/domain in prior work was not included (e.g., an alley 
cat). Finally, if an item was asked about in the KFQ (e.g., snakes) it was not repeated in 
the DES-C.  
For each interview, children were first shown a black-and-white cartoon drawing 
of each item/situation on the scale (e.g., a drawing of a snakes). The experimenter labeled 
the image (“these are snakes.”) and asked the child to report how “scared” and then how 
“grossed-out or disgusted” the item made them feel using the face scales. Children were 
always asked about fear before disgust. The list of items presented to children from each 
measure are given in Appendices E and F.   
Contagion and Conservation. Because children’s understanding of contagion and 
conservation may underlie an “adult-like” disgust response, I next interviewed children 
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about their understanding of these principles. The contagion and conservation tasks were 
similar to those used by Stevenson and colleagues (2010). To assess contagion 
understanding, children were first shown a cartoon drawing of a gender-matched sick 
child in bed and told the child had a bad cold. They were asked whether the child got the 
cold because he/she was naughty (shown a cartoon of the same child facing a wall on a 
timeout) or because the child played with a friend who had a bad cold (shown a cartoon 
of another child sick in bed; see Appendix G).  
The conservation task was also adapted from Stevenson et al (2010) but instead of 
doing the task in person, children were shown color photographs to reduce task time. 
Children saw a series of photos of a glass of water (see Appendix H). First, a single glass 
of water (picture 1; “here is a glass of water”), then the glass of water with a teaspoon of 
sugar about to be poured in (picture 2; “Now a teaspoon of sugar is being added”), then 
the glass of water with the sugar being stirred in (picture 3; “and it is getting stirred 
together”), and finally the glass of water with the sugar dissolved (picture 4; “I want to 
know what you think, why can’t we see the sugar anymore?”). Children responded to this 
open-ended question and were then directly asked, “Did it break into tiny pieces that we 
can’t see, or did it just turn into plain water?”  
Water Interview. Children were interviewed to assess their beliefs and emotions 
about tap and bottled sources of water (see Appendix I). First children were shown two 
side-by-side photos; a glass of water being filled directly from a kitchen faucet and a 
generic single serving of bottled water. They were asked whether one type of water is 
better to drink than the other or if they are both the same. Children were then asked what 
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water is better to drink when they are REALLY THIRSTY. If children chose a single 
“better” water source they were shown the emotion rating scales and asked follow-up 
questions about how [“scared”, “grossed out or disgusted”, happy] they would feel if all 
they had to drink was the undesirable water source before the experimenter continued to 
the final questions in the survey. If instead children responded that both water sources are 
the same (e.g., one is not better than the other) to drink when they are REALLY 
THIRSTY the interviewer skipped to the final few questions in the survey. The final 
questions asked all children whether water from the tap could make people sick, whether 
water from the bottle could make people sick, or whether both could make someone sick. 
They were then asked to describe how each endorsed source of water could make 
someone sick. The final two questions asked whether water could make someone sick if 
it “had dirt in it” and whether water could make someone sick if it “had germs in it.”  
Eye-tracker placement. To examine individual differences in children’s attention 
orienting, sustained attention, and disengagement from a mildly evocative fear or disgust 
relevant stimulus, mobile head-mounted eye tracking equipment was used. The positive 
science eye tracker (www.positivescience.com) consisted of headgear that was velcroed 
onto an elastic headband that fit around the widest circumference of the child’s head so it 
did not move while they walked about. Children were told that they were going to wear 
the headband like a ninja and that the headband had special cameras on it. The headgear 
consisted of two mini cameras, one situated below the right eye with an attached infra-red 
diode that illuminated the eye and recorded the child’s eye movements. The other camera 
faced outward and was mounted on the headband above the right eye to record the scene 
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(e.g., what the child was viewing; 100° diagonal field of view). A cable from the back of 
the headgear connected to a small recording device that was placed in a small backpack 
that children wore throughout the study. This setup allowed participants to be mobile 
while wearing the eye-tracking device. This equipment has previously been used with 
children in the same age range as well as with adults (Franchak & Adolph, 2010).   
Calibration.  To improve the accuracy of children’s gaze fixations measurement, 
children were first asked to complete a calibration paradigm where they were instructed 
to fixate their gaze on known, marked locations on a poster board. The calibration 
paradigm was presented to children as a game for which they could win a sticker prize. 
The experimenter told children that the two rules of the game were that they could not 
touch the headgear and that they had to keep their heads very still but follow the 
experimenter’s finger with just their eyes. The experimenter then directed the child’s 
attention to 9 different spots on a calibration board (first presented horizontally and then 
vertically), one at a time, which was approximately 1.5 meters away from the child. After 
calibration, children were told that they would next enter a room full of toys and would 
be allowed to play as long as they did not touch the headgear while the experimenter 
worked on paperwork.  
Free-play. The purpose of this free-play was to examine different components of 
children’s attention in a mild fear or disgust-relevant context. The free-play room 
contained large building blocks, a fire truck, a bowling set, some stuffed animals, and a 
magnet board with colorful letter and animal magnets stuck to it. A clear shelf was 
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mounted on the left-hand corner of the room about 38 inches above the floor (see 
Appendix J for room setup photo).  
Children were assigned to experience either a “fear” or “disgust” free play 
episode. For the fear free-play episode a 12-inch brown remote-controlled dinosaur was 
placed on the shelf and for the disgust free-play episode a 12-inch brown remote-
controlled garbage can was placed on the same shelf. All other toys were identical in the 
two conditions. The brown dinosaur had red glowing eyes, an open mouth, and bared 
sharp looking teeth. Upon a remote click from the experimenter it would move its head 
and roar for about 10 seconds. The brown garbage can had slime and dirty hand markings 
smeared on it and fake shrubbery with flies stuck to it. Upon a remote click from the 
experimenter the lid would open and close and the sound of flies buzzing was played for 
about 10 seconds.  
The free-play consisted of 3 phases in which the child was alone in the free-play 
room. Visual attention was tracked continuously with the eye-tracker and children’s 
behaviors (e.g., touching the dinosaur, what children did in the room) were video 
recorded by an overhead room camera. Phase 1 began when the child entered the room 
and ended two minutes later when the evocative stimulus became active. Phase 2 was the 
~10 second period when the evocative stimulus was active. Phase 3 started when the 
evocative stimulus ceased movement and sound, and ended two minutes later.    
Phase 1: Free play. Following a similar procedure described by Goldsmith’s 
LabTAB (Goldsmith et al., 1999), children entered a room with toys set up in specific 
locations around the room (same location for each participant) and were allowed to 
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explore and play for two minutes.  Once children entered the room, the experimenter 
started a timer and remained by the door working through some paperwork on a 
clipboard. The experimenter did not interact with the child during the free-play.   
Phase 2: Evocative stimulus. After the experimenter timed two minutes, they 
activated the fear or disgust stimulus (see Appendix K for photos) using a remote control 
(e.g., the dinosaur began to roar and move its head; the trashcan lid opened and closed 
and the sound of a fly buzzing was played). The stimulus activity lasted roughly 10 
seconds.  
Phase 3: Free play. After the stimulus stopped (ceased sound and movement) the 
experimenter began timing another two minutes. When the two minutes ended the 
experimenter came back into the room and ended the free-play session.   
Children next completed a series of tasks with their mothers that were not 
included as part of this dissertation (see Appendix A for procedures for the larger study).  
Behavioral avoidance tasks (BATs). Mother-child dyads later participated in a 
behavioral avoidance (BAT) paradigm together (see Appendix L for procedure and list of 
items). For this dissertation I focused on the child’s behavior. The purpose of the BATs 
was to assess individual differences in children’s reports of fear and disgust intensity 
(e.g., emotion ratings similar to the KFQ and DES-C interviews) and emotion-related 
behaviors (approach/avoidance) when presented with 1 control item (a neutral item – 
specifically, a rock) and 9 common fear and disgust elicitors.  
Children were invited to stand next to their mother in the back of the testing room 
on marked spots. Stimuli were housed in a cart in the front of the room that was closed on 
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three sides, hiding them from view. Children could not see what the objects were until 
they were brought out one at a time and placed on a small platform atop the cart by an 
experimenter. The experimenter presented each stimulus while labeling it (e.g., “here is 
some moldy bread”) and then asked children a series of questions about the objects. They 
were first asked to evaluate each item with the fear and disgust emotion rating scales 
(e.g., how “scared” and “grossed out or disgusted” the item made them feel). As in the 
KFQ and DES-C interviews, the order of emotion ratings was always fear and then 
disgust, for each item. Children were invited to come take a closer look, touch, and hold 
the stimuli.  Before the next item was brought out, children returned to their marked spot 
at the back of the room.  Children were first presented with a control item (the rock) 
followed by the 9 evocative stimuli which were either used in prior behavioral avoidance 
tasks or are common fear or disgust elicitors in childhood (Danovitch & Bloom, 2009; 
Hejmadi, Rozin, & Siegal, 2004; Markovitch, Netzer, & Tamir, 2015; Muris et al., 
2003, 2012; Stevenson et al., 2010).  
Data Reduction and Coding  
Emotion intensity ratings. Children’s emotion ratings were recorded throughout 
the visit by the experimenter on an iPad. Responses corresponded to increasing intensity 
values ranging from 1 to 4 (not at all = 1, a little = 2, pretty much = 3, very = 4). The sum 
total of fear ratings that children provided were used in analyses to assess subjective fear 
intensity and the sum total of disgust ratings that children provided were used to assess 
subjective disgust intensity. For each measure (e.g., KFQ, DES-C, combined KFQ and 
DES-C interview scores, and the BATs), higher totals (calculated as the sum of fear 
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ratings) indicated greater/more intense experiences of fear and higher total (sum) disgust 
ratings indicated greater/more intense feelings of disgust. Fear and disgust total scores 
were created from the KFQ and DES-C interviews separately. Separate fear and disgust 
sum scores from the KFQ and DES-C interviews were also combined to create one total 
interview fear intensity score and total interview disgust intensity score, and these were 
used in analyses.  Separate total fear and disgust ratings from the BATs were also 
created. Thus, there were eight different indicators of individual differences in children’s 
subjective fear and disgust intensity; total fear ratings from the KFQ, total fear ratings 
from the DES-C, total disgust ratings from the KFQ, total disgust ratings from the DES-
C, total sum fear ratings from the KFQ and DES-C interviews combined, total sum 
disgust ratings from the KFQ and DES-C interviews combined, total fear ratings from the 
BATs, and total disgust ratings from the BATs.  
Contagion and Conservation task. To examine whether understanding of 
contagion and conservation are necessary components that support differentiation among 
fear and disgust, I used children’s responses to contagion and conservation interview 
questions.  Contagion. Children who reported correctly that the child caught a cold from 
playing with a friend who had a cold received a score of 1 (0 for incorrect), which 
indicates contagion understanding.  
Conservation of matter. Children who reported correctly that the sugar turned into 
tiny pieces that could no longer be seen received a score of 1 (0 for incorrect) which 
indicates conservation understanding.  
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Water-related preferences, emotions, and beliefs. My third research aim was to 
understand how individual differences in disgust/fear differentiation, attention processes 
in a disgust or fear context, and individual differences in the intensities with which 
children experience fear or disgust might predict children’s preferences for bottled water, 
negative emotions towards tap water, and beliefs that tap water is contaminated (e.g., can 
make you sick). Children’s responses to the question of whether water from the sink is 
better to drink or water from the bottle is better to drink was assessed first. Responses 
that water from the sink was better to drink received a score of 0, indicating that children 
preferred tap water, whereas responses that bottled water was better to drink received a 
score of 1, indicating that children did not prefer tap water. Responses that both types of 
water were better to drink also received a score of 0, representing neither type of water 
being preferred to the other.  
The next question assessed children’s thoughts about which water source would 
be better to drink in situations where they may be in need of water (e.g., when they are 
really thirsty). In other words, the question assessed whether they would still prefer a 
particular source of water even if they were really thirsty. Children who responded that 
tap water would be better to drink or that both types of water would be better to drink 
received a score of 0, representing children who preferred tap water if they were really 
thirsty. Children who responded that bottled water would be better received a score of 1, 
representing children who still preferred bottled water over tap water even in a situation 
of extreme thirst.  
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The next two questions were only asked for children who said that one source of 
water (e.g., either bottled water or sink water) was better to drink when they were 
REALLY thirsty (but not for children who said that both sources of water were better). 
Children were first asked to rate how scared they would feel if they only had the 
undesirable water source to drink if they were really thirsty (e.g., the source that was 
NOT chosen as better) on the 4-point scales such that higher scores indicated greater fear 
of drinking that undesirable source of water even in situations of extreme thirst. This was 
followed by a second question asking children how disgusted they would feel if they 
were REALLY thirsty but only had the undesirable water to drink using the 4-point 
disgust scale. Thus, if children originally said that bottled water was better to drink if 
they were really thirsty then they would be asked these follow-up emotion questions 
about how scared and disgusted they would feel if they only had sink water (e.g., the non-
preferred water source) to drink if they were really thirsty. Because my primary interest 
was in understanding negative emotions about tap water, I only coded children’s emotion 
ratings if sink water was indicated as the non-preferred water source (e.g., if children said 
that bottled water was better to drink if they were really thirsty). Higher scores to the fear 
question thus indicated greater fear at the thought of drinking tap water even in situations 
of extreme thirst and higher scores to the disgust question indicated greater disgust at the 
thought of drinking tap water even in situations of extreme thirst.  
The last question assessed children’s beliefs about which water sources could be 
contaminated (e.g., make someone sick). All children were asked whether water from the 
bottle, water from the sink, or both sources could make someone sick. Children who said 
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water from the sink could make someone sick received a score of 1, representing children 
who believed that only tap water could be contaminated whereas children who said water 
from the bottle or both or neither received a score of 0, representing children who did not 
believe that tap water or tap water alone could make someone sick.    
Data Processing and Reduction 
Eye-tracking Calibration. The eye-tracking data were coded for different 
components of visual attention. Offline coding using Yarbus software (positive science) 
was used to identify the locations and therefore targets (from the scene camera) of 
children’s eye gaze angle with respect to the location of their pupil and the reflection 
from their corneas (using the eye camera) to tell what they were looking at. To do this, 
offline coding of the calibration paradigm in Yarbus allowed researchers to mark a 
minimum of 9 known target location (e.g., points on the calibration board) from the scene 
video as the child’s attention was directed towards it. Yarbus software then rendered 
frame by frame eye movement time series data with the gaze target (e.g., what the child 
was looking at) indicated in the scene video by a blue circular cursor with a 4 degree 
radius (see Appendix M for an example of what this calibration procedure and generated 
video looked like).  
Eye-tracking Data Processing. Datavyu software was then used to score gaze 
fixations on the fear (dinosaur) or disgust (trashcan) stimuli during the free-play. Coding 
was done separately frame by frame for the three phases of the free-play. Each video 
frame captured 33.3 ms on average, with a 1.5 degree spatial resolution. Coding for Phase 
1 (before the fear or disgust stimulus was activated) began from the first frame wherein 
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children had a complete un-occluded view of the free-play room and continued until 
Phase 2, the stimulus phase, began (e.g., the start of the first frame when the stimulus was 
activated). Phase 2, The Stimulus Phase thus began starting from the first frame when the 
stimulus was activated (sound and motion) until the stimulus ceased sound and motion 
(~10 seconds). Coding for Phase 3 began with the first frame after the stimulus stopped 
(e.g., ceased sound and motion) and continued for exactly two minutes afterwards.  
Fixations were coded as any time the blue circular cursor from the eye camera (4 
degrees) touched the target stimulus for at least two frames. Gaze was considered to be 
off of the stimulus when the circular cursor was no longer touching the target stimulus for 
at least two frames, unless gaze was off of the stimulus due to blinking or rubbing of the 
eyes (e.g., eye blinking did not count as gaze being off the stimulus if when the eyes were 
back open the gaze remained directly back on the stimulus).  
The coded data were used to derive several measures of attentional processes. 
First, I computed the latency (in milliseconds) to first orient attention to the target 
stimulus after it was activated by remote control (e.g., after sound and motion began) by 
subtracting the start time of Phase 2 (when the stimulus became active) from the frame 
when the child first fixated on the target stimulus (e.g., the blue cursor is on the stimulus 
for at least two frames). Thus, shorter latencies reflect quicker attention orienting towards 
the evocative stimulus. Second, I computed the total duration children spent looking at 
the evocative stimulus by summing together the total number of milliseconds the child 
spent fixating on the stimulus throughout phases 2 (stimulus phase) and 3 and dividing it 
by the total duration of phases 2 and 3 combined. Thus, larger values indicated a greater 
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total looking duration at the evocative stimulus once it became activated. Third, to assess 
the amount of time it took children to disengage their attention from the evocative 
stimulus I used the duration of the first gaze fixation following the stimulus onset (e.g., 
following the start of Phase 2). I standardized this score so that positive values would 
reflect longer than average latencies to “disengage” attention and negative scores would 
reflect shorter than average latencies to “disengage” attention. These three measures of 
attention (latency to first orient attention upon stimulus activation, total looking duration 
throughout the free-play episode, and time to disengage attention after first gaze 
following stimulus activation) were used as separate indexes of attention orienting, total 
looking duration, and attentional disengagement, respectively, in analyses.  
Free-play Touch/play. Offline coding of behavioral data was conducted to assess 
whether (score of 1) or not (score of 0) children touched/played with the novel evocative 
stimulus during the free-play (e.g., did they directly engage with the dinosaur or 
trashcan?). I sought to control for this behavior in analyses, given that a child who is 
actively touching/ playing with the stimulus would maintain their visual gaze on it – 
adding noise to my assessment of how attention alone is managed differently in an 
evocative context.   
Behavioral avoidance tasks. To further assess behavioral components of 
children’s emotional experiences, and avoidance in particular, for each behavioral 
approach invitation children received a score of 0 if they did not accept the invitation 
(e.g., did not touch the item) and a score of 1 if they did accept the invitation (e.g., did 
touch the item). Children were first asked if they would like to approach the cart to take a 
  
 
62 
 
closer look. This was followed by a question of whether they would want to touch the 
item, and finally they were asked if they would want to hold the item (or drink it, for the 
contaminated juice question). Thus, for each item children could receive a score that 
ranged from 0 to 3. The scoring procedure was repeated for each item and summed across 
all 10 items so scores could range from 0 (complete avoidance) to 30 (complete invitation 
acceptance/approach). I then subtracted each child’s score from 30 for reverse scoring so 
that lower scores would indicate maximal approach (e.g., the child approached the cart, 
touched, and held all items) and higher scores would indicate maximal avoidance (the 
child declined to ever approach the cart) with higher scores indicating greater avoidance.  
Emotion Differentiation. To assess the extent to which children differentiated 
between fear and disgust, children’s fear intensity ratings were correlated with their 
disgust intensity ratings. Four separate differentiation scores (e.g., four different 
correlation values) were thus computed for each child – a differentiation score using fear 
and disgust ratings from items on the KFQ interview, a separate differentiation score 
using ratings to items from the DES-C interview, a separate differentiation score using 
ratings to items from both the KFQ and DES-C interviews combined, and another 
differentiation score using ratings to items from the BATs.  Higher (positive) correlation 
magnitudes therefore indicated that the child provided more similar fear and disgust 
ratings for that assessment measure (e.g., for the KFQ), reflecting less differentiation. In 
contrast, both smaller positive correlation magnitudes and more negative indicated that 
children were differentiating more between the two emotions (provided different fear and 
disgust ratings for the individual items across the different measures).  
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Missing Data. Attention data were missing for 3 children due to equipment 
malfunction, 2 children due to emergency bathroom breaks, and 1 additional child who 
refused to wear the eye tracker. Differentiation scores could not be computed for children 
who lacked variability in their self-report responses, but this prevalence of this problem 
varied by measure (n = 1, KFQ; n = 6, DES-C, n = 13, BATs). Emotion intensity data 
were not missing for any child (the experimenter skipped one item on the KFQ for one 
child, but a sum was still computed, and this child was included in analyses). Data from 
the question asking children whether they believed that water from the sink or bottled 
could make them sick was missing for 3 children due to audio recording equipment 
malfunction, 2 children because the experimenter skipped the question, and 1 child who 
said they could not answer the question. Analyses make use of all available data and thus 
sample size varies.  
Chapter 3 
Results 
Results for this dissertation are organized into 2 sections. First, I report results 
from preliminary analyses that tested correlations among gender and the main variables 
of interest. I also report the results of manipulation checks (e.g., whether children found 
the garbage can to be disgusting and the dinosaur to be scary), and general descriptive 
information about the variables of interest. In the second section I answer each of my 
research questions in turn.  
Preliminary Analyses  
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Descriptive information, including frequencies, means, and standard deviations 
for the main variables are presented in Table 1. In Table 2 correlations among children’s 
gender, the differentiation variables (e.g., from the KFQ, the DES-C, both interviews 
combined, the BATs), the emotion intensity variables (e.g., total fear and disgust ratings 
from the KFQ, the DES-C, both interviews combined, the BATs), and avoidance scores 
from the BATs are given. In Table 3 I present correlations among children’s gender, the 
attention variables (e.g., orienting, total looking duration, disengagement), contagion and 
conservation of matter understanding, and the water-related variables (e.g., preferences, 
emotions and beliefs).  
Gender. As can be seen from Table 1, there were no significant associations 
among children’s gender, the differentiation variables, the emotion intensity variables, 
and the behavioral avoidance scores, all r’s < .235, all p’s > .064. Table 2 reveals a 
significant point-biserial correlation between gender and total looking duration, r = -.268, 
p = .034 such that girls spent a greater proportion of free-play time looking at the 
evocative stimulus. Girls also demonstrated quicker attentional disengagement from the 
evocative stimulus, r = -.272, p = .039. No other significant associations with gender 
emerged, all r’s < .225, all p’s > .147. Gender was not a focus of this dissertation and 
thus is not discussed further.  
Manipulation check. A subsample of children (N = 40) drawn from both free-
play conditions rated the two novel stimuli to provide a manipulation check (i.e., Did the 
dinosaur evoke fear? Did the trashcan evoke disgust?) at the end of the study. Children 
were shown separate color photographs of the dinosaur and the trashcan, and were asked, 
  
 
65 
 
“If this [dinosaur/ trashcan] were in the room with you, how [scared/disgusted] would 
you feel?” Children rated the intensity of fear and disgust that each made them feel with 
the cartoon face scales. A one-sample t-test revealed that children rated the photograph of 
the dinosaur as making them feel significantly more scared than a rating of 1 (not at all 
scared), t(39) = 3.127, p = .003, M = 1.530, SD = 1.062, suggesting that the dinosaur 
stimulus successfully evoked fear. A one-sample t-test revealed that children rated the 
trashcan as making them feel significantly more disgusted than a rating of 1 (not at all 
disgusted), t(39) = 7.977, p <.001, M = 2.680, SD = 1.328, suggesting that the trashcan 
free-play stimulus evoked disgust. Paired samples t-tests revealed no differences in 
children’s fear (M = 1.525, SD = 1.062) and disgust ratings (M = 1.600, SD = 1.128) for 
the dinosaur stimulus, t(39) = -.650, p = .520. But, children reported significantly more 
intense disgust (M = 2.675, SD = 1.328) than fear (M = 1.975, SD = 1.291) for the 
trashcan, t(39) = -3.009, p = .005. Thus, the novel stimuli used in the free-play episodes 
effectively evoked the target negative emotions. However, the average reported emotion 
intensities were relatively low, and the trashcan stimulus appeared to evoke discrete 
disgust more effectively than the dinosaur stimulus evoked discrete fear; these issues will 
be considered in the discussion.  
Notable associations. In this section of preliminary analyses, I describe several 
interesting associations and patterns among study variables that were not a part of my 
research questions, to fully illuminate the relations among emotional understanding, 
attentional processes, and water-related preferences, emotions, and beliefs. 
  
 
66 
 
 Differentiation scores represent the extent to which children’s ratings of fear 
correlated with their ratings of disgust (stronger positive correlations indicate less 
differentiation between the two emotions whereas weaker or negative correlations 
indicate greater differentiation). I examined the relation between various differentiation 
scores (e.g., from the interviews, from the BATs) to explore whether these were 
convergent or divergent across the task types. Greater differentiation between fear and 
disgust in response to typical disgust elicitors from the DES-C interview was related to 
greater differentiation in response to items presented during the BATs, r = .278, p = .042. 
Similarly, greater differentiation between fear and disgust on the KFQ interview was 
associated with greater differentiation between fear and disgust on the DES-C, r = .438, p 
< .001. Thus, children demonstrated more consistent differentiation across items 
presented hypothetically in the interviews. Interestingly, the extent of convergence 
between the hypothetical and in-person differentiation scores depended on the type of 
elicitors children were asked about. Differentiation of fear and disgust in response to 
typical fear elicitors from the KFQ, however, did not relate to differentiation of fear and 
disgust in response to items presented during the BATs. This suggests that perhaps the 
BAT items evoked greater disgust than fear, explaining the greater consistency in 
differentiation across the DES-C (e.g., disgust items) and BATs (e.g., items on both 
perhaps evoked stronger disgust) than across the KFQ (e.g., fear items) and BATs. To 
probe this further, I ran a paired samples t-test with fear and disgust ratings from the 
BATs and found that children did indeed report greater disgust (M = 21.855, SD = 7.574) 
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than fear (M = 19.043, SD = 6.848), t(68) = -4.388, p < .001, d = .528, in response to the 
in-person items.  
Higher reported ratings of fear on any index (e.g., KFQ, DES-C, both interviews 
combined, BATs) were related to higher ratings of disgust on any index (e.g., KFQ, DES-
C, both interviews combined, BATs).  However, the intensity with which children 
reported feeling disgust or fear (across any index) was not related to behaviorally 
approaching or interacting with the items from the BATs. Interestingly, quicker attention 
orientation towards the evocative stimulus after it became active was related to longer 
time spend looking at it during the free-play, r = -.297, p = .018, consistent with an 
attentional pattern reflective of hypervigilance to threatening information.  
Age was positively associated with better understanding of contagion, r = .284, p 
= .018, and conservation of matter, r = .478, p <.001, and preferences for bottled water 
over tap water, r = .237, p = .050. However, age was not related to beliefs that water from 
the sink (but not water from the bottle) could make children sick, r = .149, p = .243, 
suggesting that this belief was held consistently regardless of age. Related, roughly half 
of the sample believed that tap water (but not bottled water) could make you sick 
(49.3%). Age was also inversely associated with feelings of fear about having only tap 
water to drink when really thirsty, r = -.310, p = .043, but did not relate to feelings of 
disgust about having only tap water to drink when really thirsty, r = -.228, p = .141. This 
could be because regardless of age, children in general felt tap water is disgusting or 
could be because very few children felt tap water is disgusting. I ran a paired-samples t-
test to investigate whether children reported more intense disgust or fear when asked to 
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imagine having only tap water to drink if they were really thirsty. Children reported 
feeling greater disgust (M = 2.698, SD = 1.389) than fear (M = 2.163, SD = 1.326), t(42) 
= -2.222, p = .032, d = .342 suggesting that the lack of association between age and 
disgust is because children across ages 4-7 perceive tap water to be similarly disgusting.  
Understanding of contagion was associated with a preference for bottled water 
over tap water, r = .292, p = .015. Understanding of conservation of matter was 
associated with less intense feelings of fear at the thought of being really thirsty and only 
having tap water to drink, r = -.353, p = .020, but there was no relation between 
understanding of conservation of matter and feeling disgusted at the thought of being 
really thirsty and only having tap water to drink, r = -.111, p = .479. Reporting greater 
fear at the thought of being really thirsty and only having tap water to drink was 
associated with reporting more intense disgust in response to this thought as well, r = 
.325, p = .034. And, a preference for bottled water over tap water was associated with the 
belief that water from the sink (but not water from the bottle or both water from a sink 
and bottle) could make children sick, r = .293, p = .020. Of note, roughly 65% of the 4-
to-7-year-old sample reported a preference for bottled water (i.e., said that water from a 
bottle is better to drink than tap water) and close to 50% held the belief that tap water (but 
not bottled water) was contaminated and could make you sick. Only 4% of children 
lacked understanding of contagion, whereas roughly 62% of children did not demonstrate 
understanding of conservation of matter.  
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Table 1. Frequencies, Means, & Standard Deviations  
 
 
 
 
 
Gender 34 boys 35 girls
No Yes
Contagion 3.00 66.00
Conservation 43.00 26.00
Bottled Water is Better 24.00 45.00
Tap Water Can Make You Sick 29.00 34.00
Touch the Stimulus? 56.00 12.00
Min Max M SD
Exact Age 4.245 7.749 5.999 0.962
KFQ Differentiation -0.630 1.000 0.218 0.307
DES-C Differentiation -0.770 0.900 0.071 0.402
Interviews Differentiation -0.615 1.000 0.165 0.340
BATs Differentiation -0.364 1.000 0.275 0.387
KFQ Total Fear 27.000 103.000 72.246 17.772
DES-C Total Fear 20.000 80.000 50.232 16.269
Interviews Total Fear 47.000 178.000 122.478 31.157
KFQ Total Disgust 27.000 101.000 53.594 18.467
DES-C Total Disgust 20.000 80.000 52.797 16.687
Interviews Total Disgust 47.000 179.000 106.391 31.799
BATs Total Fear 10.000 33.000 19.043 6.848
BATs Total Disgust 10.000 37.000 21.855 7.574
BATs Avoidance 0.000 30.000 12.087 8.027
Tap Water Fear 1.000 4.000 2.163 1.326
Tap Water Disgust 1.000 4.000 2.698 1.389
Latency to Orient 0.165 130.973 16.366 35.447
Total Looking Duration 0.000 0.494 0.081 0.099
Disengagement 0.068 14.382 1.674 2.474
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Table 2. Associations among gender, age, differentiation, fear and disgust totals, and 
avoidance  
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1. Gender 1
2. Age 0.003 1
3. KFQ Differentiation 0.028 -0.138 1
4. DES-C Differentiation -0.235 -0.083 0.438 1
5. Interviews 
Differentiation
-0.157 -0.212 0.781 0.848 1
6. BATs Differentiation -0.072 -0.053 0.256 0.278 0.364 1
7. KFQ Fear Total 0.195 -0.047 0.036 -0.149 -0.203 0.097 1
8. DES-C Fear Total 0.118 -0.119 -0.023 0.192 0.099 0.207 0.675 1
9. Interviews Fear Total 0.173 -0.089 0.008 0.016 -0.062 0.174 0.923 0.907 1
10. KFQ Disgust Total 0.124 -0.218 0.243 0.208 0.225 0.358 0.656 0.682 0.730 1
11. DES-C Disgust Total 0.112 0.026 -0.072 0.103 -0.006 0.072 0.644 0.799 0.785 0.635 1
12. Interviews Disgust 
Total
0.131 -0.113 0.105 0.180 0.129 0.262 0.719 0.816 0.836 0.914 0.894 1
13. BATs Fear Total 0.143 -0.051 -0.136 -0.045 -0.178 0.410 0.519 0.424 0.517 0.446 0.413 0.475 1
14. BATs Disgust Total 0.116 0.127 -0.210 -0.211 -0.312 0.236 0.591 0.398 0.545 0.362 0.588 0.519 0.732 1
15. BATs Avoidance 
Total 
-0.054 -0.139 0.046 -0.241 -0.068 -0.119 0.080 -0.037 0.026 -0.014 -0.154 -0.089 0.009 -0.071
t
t
t
**
**
t
*
t
**
*
t
t
**
t
t
**
**
t
**
t
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
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**
**
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**
**
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**
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**
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Table 3. Associations among gender, attention, contagion, conservation and the water 
variables  
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
Research Question 1: Are there age-related differences in children’s differentiation 
between fear and disgust? 
Hypothesis 1a) I first ran a series of bivariate correlations to examine whether 
age would relate to children’s differentiation between fear and disgust. Separate 
differentiation scores were generated from responses to (1) the KFQ, (2) the DES-C, (3) 
both interviews combined, and (4) the BATs. Differentiation scores were created by 
correlating each child’s reported fear intensity and each child’s reported disgust intensity 
for each measure. Thus, lower values represent greater differentiation between fear and 
disgust. As depicted in Table 4, there were no significant associations between age and 
children’s differentiation scores from any index, suggesting that children differentiated 
between fear and disgust to a similar extent regardless of age.  
Hypothesis 1b) I next used bivariate correlations to test my expectation that 
children’s understanding of contagion and conservation of matter would relate to 
differentiation between fear and disgust (Table 4). I also explored these same associations 
in age-partialled correlations (Table 5). Again the 4 separate differentiation scores were 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Gender 1
2. Latency to Orient 0.086 1
3. Total Looking Duration -0.268 -0.297 1
4. Disengagement -0.272 -0.099 0.187 1
5. Contagion Understanding -0.068 0.043 -0.335 -0.102 1
6. Conservation of Matter Understanding 0.049 -0.001 0.025 -0.161 0.019 1
7. Bottled Water is Better -0.111 -0.093 0.062 0.075 0.292 0.128 1
8. Fear of Drinking Tap Water -0.038 -0.010 -0.249 -0.067 -0.057 -0.353 -0.049 1
9. Disgusted by Drinking Tap Water 0.225 0.018 -0.087 0.137 -0.209 -0.111 0.026 0.325 1
10. Tap Water Can Make You Sick 0.052 -0.228 0.072 0.174 0.014 0.171 0.293 -0.216 0.285
*
*
*
t
**
*
*
*
*
t
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used. Note that although I had specific hypotheses about how understanding of contagion 
would relate to emotion differentiation, because only 3 children in this sample failed to 
demonstrate an understanding of contagion I was not able to test this hypothesis and did 
not pursue further analyses with contagion. As depicted in Table 4, there were no 
significant associations between children’s understanding of conservation of matter and 
differentiation scores from any index.  
Partial correlations (Table 5) also revealed no significant associations between 
understanding of conservation of matter and the extent to which children differentiated 
between fear and disgust, when controlling for children’s age, all r’s < .094, p’s > .505.  
Table 4. Associations among age, differentiation, contagion and conservation 
understanding 
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Age 1
2. Contagion Understanding 0.284 1
3. Conservation Understanding 0.478 0.019 1
4. KFQ Differentiation -0.138 0.090 -0.170 1
5. DES-C Differentiation -0.083 -0.024 -0.082 0.438 1
6. Interviews Differentiation -0.212 0.015 -0.202 0.781 0.848 1
7. BATs Differentiation -0.053 -0.122 0.033 0.256 0.278 0.364
*
**
t t
**
**
t
**
* **
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Table 5. Age-partialled associations among differentiation, contagion and conservation 
understanding  
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
Hypothesis 1c) For this set of exploratory analyses (see Table 6) I examined how 
children’s total fear and total disgust (summed) ratings from (1) the KFQ, (2) the DES-C, 
(3) both interviews combined, and (4) the BATs each correlated with their 4 emotion 
differentiation scores (from the KFQ, the DES-C, the interviews combined, and from the 
BATs). I also examined the extent to which the differentiation scores related to children’s 
behavioral avoidance score from the BATs.  
I assessed differentiation by asking children to rate how scared and how disgusted 
they felt in response to typical fear elicitors using a standard fear assessment (the KFQ) 
and in response to typical disgust elicitors using a standard disgust assessment (the DES-
C). My original plan was to combine children’s responses to items from both interview 
measures and generate a single differentiation value from all items asked about in both 
the KFQ and DES-C, (hereafter: “the interviews combined”). However, because each 
interview was meant to elicit responses to a specific emotion context (e.g., fear for the 
KFQ and disgust for the DES-C), I was able to explore and compare the extent to which 
children demonstrate differentiation of fear and disgust in response to fear and disgust 
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elicitors. In other words, the fear-focused items on the KFQ allowed me to also explore 
the extent to which children’s differentiation of fear and disgust in response to fear-
related threat items (e.g., a KFQ differentiation value) related to the reported intensity 
with which they felt both fear and disgust.  Similarly, I was able to explore how 
differentiation of fear and disgust in response to disgust-related threat items related to 
children’s reported intensity of both fear and disgust.  
As can be seen in Table 6, less differentiation between fear and disgust in 
response to standard fear elicitors (the KFQ) was associated with greater reported disgust 
in response to standard fear elicitors, r = .243, p = .046. Less differentiation of fear and 
disgust when presented with items in person was also associated with greater reported 
disgust to standard fear elicitors (the KFQ), r = .358, p = .007. Less differentiation of fear 
and disgust when presented with items in person was marginally associated with greater 
reported disgust across the interviews combined, r = .262, p = .051. Less differentiation 
of fear and disgust when presented with items in person was associated with greater 
reported fear when presented with items in person, r = .410, p = .002. Greater 
differentiation of fear and disgust in response to the interviews combined, was associated 
with greater intensity of disgust to items presented in person r = -.312, p = .010.  
 
 
 
  
 
75 
 
Table 6. Associations among differentiation scores, fear and disgust intensity, and 
approach behavior from the BATs.  
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
Hypothesis 1d) I next used a paired samples t-test to compare whether children’s 
differentiation of fear and disgust in response to items from the fear measure (the KFQ) 
(M differentiation = .202, SD = .293) diverged from differentiation scores on the disgust 
measure (e.g., DES-C) (M differentiation = .071, SD = .402). I found a significant 
difference, t(62) = 2.741, p = .008, d = .345, such that children showed greater 
differentiation between fear and disgust when asked about items from the disgust 
measure. I followed this up with a paired t-test to check whether the KFQ evoked more 
fear (M = 72.246, SD = 17.772) than disgust (M = 53.594, SD = 18.467) and found that 
children self-reported greater fear to items on the KFQ, t(68) = 10.294, p < .001, d = 
1.24. In addition, I checked whether the DES-C evoked more disgust (M = 52.797, SD = 
16.687) than fear (M = 50.232, SD = 16.269). and found that children self-reported 
greater disgust to items on the DES-C, t(68) = -2.040, p = .045, d = .245.   
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Hypothesis 1e) I also used a paired samples t-test to examine whether children 
showed greater differentiation between fear and disgust in response to hypothetical (the 
interviews) versus in-person (the BATs) items. Children showed greater differentiation 
when asked about hypothetical items (M = .136, SD = .315) compared to in-person items 
(M = .275, SD = .387), t(55) = -2.599, p = .012, d =.347, suggesting that the “imminence” 
of the potential threats may have played a role in children’s appraisals of the two threat-
relevant emotions; items presented hypothetically pose less of an immediate threat than 
those presented in person. I followed this up with a paired samples t-test to examine 
whether the BATs items evoked more disgust (M = 21.855, SD = 7.574) than fear (M = 
19.044, SD = 6.848), and found that they did, t(68) = -4.388, p < .001, d = .528.  
Research Question 2: Do attention patterns vary across fear and disgust contexts or 
relate to children’s emotional responding?    
Hypothesis 2a and 2b) I used a repeated measures ANCOVA to assess the extent 
to which the three attention components of interest – how quickly children oriented to the 
evocative stimulus after it was activated (orienting), the proportion of free-play time 
children looked at the evocative stimulus (total looking duration), and how quickly 
children disengaged their attention after first looking at the evocative stimulus once it 
was activated (disengagement)-- would vary based on the emotion free-play context 
children experienced (disgust or fear). I controlled for whether or not children ever 
touched the evocative stimulus to account for the fact that some children may have been 
looking at it for much longer durations because they were playing with it. There was no 
between-person effect of free-play condition, F(1, 55) = .787, p = .379. Thus, contrary to 
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hypotheses, I found no evidence that attention patterns varied across fear and disgust 
emotion contexts.   
Hypothesis 2c and 2d) I next ran hierarchical multiple regression analyses for 
each free-play context separately to examine whether emotion differentiation was 
predicted by the three attention components. Bivariate correlations are provided in Table 
7. The model-building process for the regressions examining the dinosaur (Table 8) and 
trashcan (Table 9) conditions was identical. I used differentiation scores from the KFQ, 
the DES-C, the interviews combined, and the BATs as separate dependent variables in 
four separate models. In the first step of all models I controlled for whether or not 
children touched the evocative stimulus. My independent variables were entered into the 
second step of the model and were the three attention measures (e.g., orienting, total 
looking duration, and disengagement). No models or effects within the model steps were 
significant for any analysis.  
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Table 7. Associations among differentiation scores and attention  
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
Note. Dinosaur/fear condition data are below the diagonal and trashcan/disgust condition 
data are above the diagonal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. KFQ Differentiation 1 0.484 0.851 0.331 -0.011 0.054 0.159
2. DES-C Differentiation 0.402 1 0.843 0.308 -0.070 0.086 0.140
3. Interviews Differentiation 0.716 0.858 1 0.470 0.005 0.099 0.193
4. BATs Differentiation 0.221 0.182 0.263 1 -0.307 -0.030 0.261
5. Orienting 0.092 -0.199 -0.143 -0.219 1 -0.427 -0.090
6. Total Looking Duration -0.180 -0.149 -0.103 -0.106 -0.209 1 0.378
7. Disengagement -0.142 0.020 -0.009 0.068 -0.178 0.104 1
*
** **
*
*
**
**
**** t
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Table 8. Dinosaur/Fear Free-play: Attention Did Not Predict Differentiation   
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
KFQ Differentiation R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.044 0.300 0.052 1.000 27.000 0.821
2 0.332 0.300 0.975 3.000 24.000 0.421
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 0.185 0.065 2.823 0.009 0.050 0.319
Ever Touch? -0.029 0.125 -0.229 0.821 -0.284 0.227
Constant 0.149 0.087 1.721 0.098 -0.030 0.328
Ever Touch? 0.079 0.172 0.461 0.649 -0.275 0.433
Orienting 0.008 0.007 1.084 0.289 -0.007 0.023
Total Looking Duration -0.471 0.626 -0.753 0.459 -1.763 0.820
Disengagement -0.034 0.059 -0.577 0.570 -0.155 0.087
DES-C Differentiation R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.039 0.432 0.039 1 25 0.845
2 0.218 0.45 0.354 3 22 0.786
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 0.046 0.097 0.476 0.638 -0.153 0.245
Ever Touch? -0.037 0.190 -0.197 0.845 -0.428 0.354
Constant 0.093 0.140 0.660 0.516 -0.198 0.384
Ever Touch? 0.084 0.260 0.323 0.750 -0.455 0.623
Orienting 0.001 0.011 0.126 0.901 -0.022 0.024
Total Looking Duration -1.071 1.172 -0.914 0.371 -3.501 1.359
Disengagement 0.017 0.089 0.194 0.848 -0.167 0.201
Interviews Differentiation R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.113 0.355 0.35 1 27 0.559
2 0.182 0.372 0.168 3 24 0.917
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 0.155 0.077 1.999 0.056 -0.004 0.314
Ever Touch? -0.087 0.147 -0.592 0.559 -0.390 0.215
Constant 0.138 0.107 1.286 0.211 -0.084 0.359
Ever Touch? -0.069 0.213 -0.323 0.749 -0.508 0.370
Orienting 0.005 0.009 0.573 0.572 -0.013 0.024
Total Looking Duration -0.162 0.776 -0.208 0.837 -1.763 1.439
Disengagement 0.016 0.073 0.213 0.833 -0.135 0.166
BATs Differentiation R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.223 0.362 1.103 1 21 0.305
2 0.48 0.352 1.408 3 18 0.273
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 0.126 0.088 1.430 0.167 -0.057 0.308
Ever Touch? 0.181 0.172 1.050 0.305 -0.177 0.538
Constant 0.255 0.114 2.225 0.039 0.014 0.495
Ever Touch? 0.470 0.230 2.046 0.056 -0.013 0.952
Orienting -0.011 0.009 -1.190 0.250 -0.029 0.008
Total Looking Duration -1.951 0.995 -1.962 0.065 -4.041 0.138
Disengagement -0.028 0.071 -0.394 0.699 -0.176 0.121
**
t
t
*
t
t
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Table 9. Trashcan/Disgust Free-play: Attention Did Not Predict Differentiation 
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
KFQ Differentiation R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.118 0.312 0.382 1.000 27.000 0.542
2 0.401 0.305 1.396 3.000 24.000 0.268
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 0.276 0.060 4.602 0.000 0.153 0.399
Ever Touch? -0.141 0.229 -0.618 0.542 -0.610 0.328
Constant 0.177 0.102 1.730 0.096 -0.034 0.387
Ever Touch? -0.119 0.264 -0.450 0.656 -0.663 0.426
Orienting 0.007 0.004 1.898 0.070 -0.001 0.016
Total Looking Duration 0.375 1.003 0.374 0.712 -1.694 2.444
Disengagement 0.047 0.072 0.662 0.514 -0.100 0.195
DES-C Differentiation R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.019 0.424 0.009 1 24 0.926
2 0.248 0.439 0.457 3 21 0.715
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 0.111 0.087 1.280 0.213 -0.068 0.289
Ever Touch? 0.029 0.312 0.093 0.926 -0.615 0.673
Constant 0.158 0.152 1.035 0.312 -0.159 0.474
Ever Touch? 0.050 0.382 0.131 0.897 -0.744 0.844
Orienting -0.008 0.009 -0.948 0.354 -0.026 0.010
Total Looking Duration -0.107 1.452 -0.074 0.942 -3.126 2.912
Disengagement 0.073 0.115 0.632 0.534 -0.167 0.312
Interviews Differentiation R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.113 0.355 0.350 1 27 0.559
2 0.182 0.372 0.168 3 24 0.917
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 0.155 0.077 1.999 0.056 -0.004 0.314
Ever Touch? -0.087 0.147 -0.592 0.559 -0.390 0.215
Constant 0.138 0.107 1.286 0.211 -0.084 0.359
Ever Touch? -0.069 0.213 -0.323 0.749 -0.508 0.370
Orienting 0.005 0.009 0.573 0.572 -0.013 0.024
Total Looking Duration -0.162 0.776 -0.208 0.837 -1.763 1.439
Disengagement 0.016 0.073 0.213 0.833 -0.135 0.166
BATs Differentiation R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.405 0.353 4.127 1 21 0.055
2 0.483 0.365 0.541 3 18 0.660
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 0.461 0.077 5.987 0.000 0.301 0.622
Ever Touch? -0.531 0.261 -2.031 0.055 -1.074 0.013
Constant 0.520 0.216 2.408 0.027 0.066 0.973
Ever Touch? -0.264 0.403 -0.655 0.521 -1.111 0.583
Orienting 0.006 0.023 0.256 0.801 -0.042 0.054
Total Looking Duration -1.551 2.206 -0.703 0.491 -6.186 3.084
Disengagement 0.118 0.102 1.153 0.264 -0.097 0.333
t
t
t
t
*
t
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Hypothesis 2e and 2f) I next ran 9 hierarchical regression analyses, collapsing 
across free-play contexts, to examine the extent to which individual differences in fear 
intensity, disgust intensity, and behavioral avoidance would each be predicted by the 3 
components of attention. The bivariate correlations are provided in Table 10. Three 
regression models (Table 11) predicted fear intensity from the interviews quantified three 
ways: as 1) total fear ratings from the KFQ, 2) total fear ratings from the DES-C, and 3) 
total fear ratings from both interviews combined. Three similarly-constructed models 
predicted disgust intensity from the interviews quantified in the same ways (Table 12). 
And, 3 additional regression models predicted emotion responding from the BATs 
quantified three ways: 1) total fear ratings from the BATs, 2) total disgust ratings from 
the BATs, and 3) total avoidance behaviors from the BATs (Table 13).  
For all 9 models, I entered whether children touched the evocative stimulus as a 
covariate in the first step. The attention measures (orienting, total looking duration, and 
disengagement) were entered into the second step of the model. As can be seen in Tables 
10-12, none of the models were significant. Including the attention variables did not 
improve the model fit. Although the models overall were not significant, orienting 
appeared to be an important predictor. I thus ran follow-up “trimmed” regression 
analyses where I retained the covariate in the first step of the model but dropped the non-
significant attention variables – total looking duration and disengagement -- to test 
whether orienting alone might relate to the differentiation, reported emotion intensity, 
and avoidance behavior outcomes of interest. These models remained non-significant 
even after trimming the non-significant predictors. Furthermore, the orientation variable 
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did not improve the fit of any model and was no longer a significant predictor when 
considered alone.  
Table 10. Associations among attention and emotion responding variables  
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Orienting 1
2. Total Looking Duration -0.297 1
3. Disengagement -0.099 0.187 1
4. KFQ Fear Total 0.039 -0.092 -0.141 1
5. DES-C Fear Total -0.030 -0.121 -0.100 0.675 1
6. Interviews Fear Total 0.007 -0.118 -0.135 0.923 0.907 1
7. KFQ Disgust Total -0.058 -0.184 -0.032 0.656 0.682 0.730 1
8. DES-C Disgust Total -0.045 -0.143 -0.047 0.644 0.799 0.785 0.635 1
9. Interviews Disgust Total -0.057 -0.183 -0.044 0.719 0.816 0.836 0.914 0.894 1
10. BATs Fear Total 0.013 -0.172 0.019 0.519 0.424 0.517 0.446 0.413 0.475 1
11. BATs Disgust Total 0.073 -0.104 0.004 0.591 0.398 0.545 0.362 0.588 0.519 0.732 1
12. BATs Avoidance -0.079 -0.093 0.215 -0.080 0.037 -0.026 0.014 0.154 0.089 -0.009 0.071
*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
** **
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Table 11. Attention Did Not Predict Fear Intensity from the Interviews  
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
 
 
 
KFQ Fear R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.025 17.418 0.034 1.000 56.000 0.854
2 0.296 17.107 1.684 3.000 53.000 0.181
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 72.417 2.514 28.804 0.000 67.380 77.453
Ever Touch? -1.117 6.055 -0.184 0.854 -13.246 11.012
Constant 76.321 3.481 21.926 0.000 69.339 83.302
Ever Touch? 1.777 7.166 0.248 0.805 -12.596 16.150
Orienting -0.373 0.192 -1.946 0.057 -0.757 0.011
Total Looking Duration -21.374 28.141 -0.760 0.451 -77.819 35.071
Disengagement -2.551 2.311 -1.104 0.275 -7.186 2.084
DES-C Fear R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.119 15.574 0.8 1 56 0.375
2 0.328 15.232 1.848 3 53 0.150
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 50.542 2.248 22.483 0.000 46.038 55.045
Ever Touch? -4.842 5.414 -0.894 0.375 -15.687 6.004
Constant 54.509 3.099 17.587 0.000 48.293 60.726
Ever Touch? -2.309 6.381 -0.362 0.719 -15.107 10.489
Orienting -0.378 0.171 -2.218 0.031 -0.720 -0.036
Total Looking Duration -20.966 25.058 -0.837 0.407 -71.225 29.294
Disengagement -1.526 2.058 -0.741 0.462 -5.653 2.602
Interviews Fear R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.077 29.7 0.333 1 56 0.566
2 0.341 28.794 2.199 3 53 0.099
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 122.958 4.287 28.679 0.000 114.369 131.547
Ever Touch? -5.958 10.326 -0.577 0.566 -26.643 14.726
Constant 130.830 5.859 22.331 0.000 119.079 142.581
Ever Touch? -0.533 12.061 -0.044 0.965 -24.724 23.659
Orienting -0.751 0.322 -2.330 0.024 -1.398 -0.104
Total Looking Duration -42.340 47.366 -0.894 0.375 -137.344 52.665
Disengagement -4.076 3.890 -1.048 0.299 -11.878 3.725
**
t
**
**
**
*
t
**
**
*
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Table 12. Attention Did Not Predict Disgust Intensity from the Interviews  
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
 
 
 
KFQ Disgust R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.171 17.505 1.689 1.000 56.000 0.199
2 0.303 17.407 1.212 3.000 53.000 0.314
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 54.208 2.527 21.455 0.000 49.147 59.270
Ever Touch? -7.908 6.085 -1.300 0.199 -20.098 4.281
Constant 58.771 3.542 16.594 0.000 51.667 65.875
Ever Touch? -3.435 7.291 -0.471 0.639 -18.060 11.189
Orienting -0.322 0.195 -1.651 0.105 -0.713 0.069
Total Looking Duration -35.927 28.634 -1.255 0.215 -93.359 21.506
Disengagement -0.142 2.351 -0.060 0.952 -4.858 4.574
DES-C Disgust R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.100 16.377 0.565 1 56 0.455
2 0.326 15.996 1.898 3 53 0.141
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 52.979 2.364 22.413 0.000 48.244 57.714
Ever Touch? -4.279 5.693 -0.752 0.455 -15.683 7.125
Constant 57.863 3.255 17.778 0.000 51.335 64.391
Ever Touch? -0.353 6.701 -0.053 0.958 -13.793 13.087
Orienting -0.398 0.179 -2.224 0.030 -0.758 -0.039
Total Looking Duration -32.588 26.314 -1.238 0.221 -85.368 20.192
Disengagement -0.623 2.161 -0.288 0.774 -4.957 3.712
Interviews Disgust R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.152 30.437 1.327 1 56 0.254
2 0.344 29.724 1.906 3 53 0.140
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 107.188 4.393 24.399 0.000 98.387 115.988
Ever Touch? -12.188 10.580 -1.152 0.254 -33.382 9.007
Constant 116.634 6.048 19.285 0.000 104.504 128.765
Ever Touch? -3.789 12.451 -0.304 0.762 -28.762 21.185
Orienting -0.720 0.333 -2.164 0.035 -1.388 -0.053
Total Looking Duration -68.514 48.896 -1.401 0.167 -166.587 29.559
Disengagement -0.765 4.015 -0.190 0.850 -8.818 7.289
**
**
**
**
*
**
**
*
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Table 13. Attention Did Not Predict Emotional Responding During the BATs 
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
 
 
BATs Fear R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.062 6.972 0.219 1.000 56.000 0.642
2 0.274 6.906 1.358 3.000 53.000 0.266
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 19.333 1.006 19.211 0.000 17.317 21.349
Ever Touch? -1.133 2.424 -0.468 0.642 -5.988 3.722
Constant 21.321 1.405 15.172 0.000 18.502 24.139
Ever Touch? 1.089 2.893 0.376 0.708 -4.714 6.891
Orienting -0.119 0.077 -1.540 0.129 -0.274 0.036
Total Looking Duration -17.810 11.361 -1.568 0.123 -40.597 4.977
Disengagement 0.278 0.933 0.298 0.767 -1.594 2.149
BATs Disgust R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.026 7.405 0.037 1 56 0.848
2 0.206 7.451 0.769 3 53 0.516
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 21.604 1.069 20.214 0.000 19.463 23.745
Ever Touch? 0.496 2.574 0.193 0.848 -4.660 5.652
Constant 23.206 1.516 15.308 0.000 20.166 26.247
Ever Touch? 2.231 3.121 0.715 0.478 -4.029 8.491
Orienting -0.102 0.083 -1.223 0.227 -0.269 0.065
Total Looking Duration -13.782 12.257 -1.124 0.266 -38.366 10.801
Disengagement 0.071 1.006 0.070 0.944 -1.948 2.089
BATs Avoidance R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.129 7.900 0.949 1 56 0.334
2 0.338 7.709 1.940 3 53 0.134
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 17.625 1.140 15.456 0.000 15.341 19.909
Ever Touch? 2.675 2.746 0.974 0.334 -2.826 8.176
Constant 15.909 1.568 10.143 0.000 12.763 19.055
Ever Touch? 1.942 3.229 0.601 0.550 -4.535 8.419
Orienting 0.132 0.086 1.529 0.132 -0.041 0.305
Total Looking Duration 10.796 12.681 0.851 0.398 -14.639 36.230
Disengagement -1.819 1.041 -1.747 0.086 -3.908 0.269
**
**
**
**
**
**
t
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Research Question 3: Do aspects of children’s emotional development relate to their 
water-related preferences, emotions, and beliefs?  
Because tap water can pose a potential threat that does not correspond to a 
specific discrete emotion context, it was less important to consider differentiation scores 
and emotion intensity rating scores from the KFQ (e.g., fear eliciting items) and DES-C 
(e.g., disgust eliciting items) separately. Furthermore, I did not have hypotheses about 
how children’s emotion differentiation or intensity of reported disgust or fear in response 
to fear (e.g., KFQ) or disgust (e.g., DES-C) elicitors, specifically, would relate to water-
related preferences, emotions, and beliefs. So, instead of using differentiation and 
emotion rating scores from all 4 indexes (e.g., KFQ, DES-C, interviews combined, 
BATs) to answer my final research question I used differentiation and emotion rating 
scores from the interviews combined and the BATs only.  
Hypothesis 3a) I first ran bivariate correlations (Table 14) to examine whether 
the extent to which children showed differentiation of fear and disgust related to their a) 
preference for bottled water, emotional self-reports of ratings of b) disgust and c) fear at 
the thought of only having tap water to drink if they were very thirsty, and d) belief that 
tap water but not bottled water could make children sick (e.g., is contaminated). As can 
be seen from Table 14, I found that less differentiation of fear and disgust from the 
hypothetical items (the interviews) related to greater reported fear intensity at the thought 
of only having tap water to drink, r = .510, p = .001. Furthermore, less differentiation of 
fear and disgust in response to the in-person items from the BATs was also related to 
greater reported fear intensity at the thought of only having tap water to drink, r = .431, p 
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= .010. Together, these correlations suggest moderate associations between children’s 
early understanding of emotions and their feelings about tap water. Interestingly, 
differentiation scores were not related to the extent to which children reported feelings of 
disgust in response to the thought of only having tap water to drink if they were really 
thirsty. No associations between differentiation and water-related preferences or beliefs 
were found. 
Table 14. Associations among differentiation, emotion intensity, and water-related 
preferences, emotions and beliefs  
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
Hypothesis 3b) Using separate regression models I next examined whether 
specific attention patterns (i.e., orienting, total looking duration, disengagement) 
predicted a) children’s preference for bottled water and b) the belief that tap water only 
(but not bottled water) could make them sick. For these analyses, I collapsed across free-
play conditions. Because both dependent variables were dichotomous, logistic regression 
was used (Table 15). In addition, I examined how attention patterns predicted the 
intensity of children’s a) disgust and b) fear at the thought of only having tap water to 
drink if they were really thirsty using hierarchical multiple regression (Table 16).  
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The model building process for the logistic and hierarchical multiple regression 
models was the same. Whether or not children ever touched the evocative stimulus was 
controlled for in Step 1. In Step 2 I added the attention predictors (orienting, total looking 
duration, disengagement). As can be seen in Table 15, none of the attention variables 
related to an increased likelihood of reporting that bottled water is better to drink, or that 
water from the tap could make someone sick. Similarly, the models with attention 
predicting children’s reported disgust or fear at the thought of only having tap water to 
drink were not significant.  
Table 15. Attention did not predict children’s preferences for bottled water or beliefs that 
tap water can make them sick  
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
 
 
 
 
95% CI 95% CI
LB UB
Did Children Touch the Stimulus? 1.140 1.066 1.143 1 0.285 3.127 0.387 25.278
Orienting -0.033 0.026 1.621 1 0.203 0.968 0.920 1.018
Total Looking Duration -2.208 3.703 0.356 1 0.551 0.110 0.000 155.851
Disengagement 0.179 0.362 0.243 1 0.622 1.196 0.588 2.433
Constant 0.899 0.447 4.040 1 0.044 2.458
95% CI 95% CI
LB UB
Did Children Touch the Stimulus? 0.608 1.007 0.365 1 0.546 1.837 0.255 13.223
Orienting -0.004 0.023 0.024 1 0.878 0.996 0.953 1.042
Total Looking Duration -1.716 3.549 0.234 1 0.629 0.180 0.000 188.465
Disengagement 0.502 0.417 1.451 1 0.228 1.652 0.730 3.737
Constant 0.482 0.443 1.182 1 0.277 1.619
Step 1
Step 1
DV: Tap Water Can Make You Sick
B S.E. Wald df p Exp(B)
DV: Bottled Water is Better to Drink
B S.E. Wald df p Exp(B)
*
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Table 16. Attention did not predict the intensity of children’s water-related disgust or 
fear 
 
Note. tp <.10, *p <.05, **p <.01 
Hypothesis 3c and 3d) Using bivariate correlations (Table 14), I next examined 
how different aspects of children’s emotion responding related to their preferences for 
bottled water (e.g., bottled water is better to drink), the intensity of their reported fear and 
disgust over the thought of only having tap water to drink, and their belief that only sink 
water (but not bottled water) could make them sick. As a reminder, to capture individual 
differences in emotional responding I used the intensity of children’s self-reported fear 
and disgust from the interviews combined as well as from the BATs. Children’s total 
behavioral avoidance scores from the BATs were additionally used.  
Fear from Drinking Tap Water R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.002 1.346 <.001 1.000 34.000 0.992
2 0.392 1.297 1.874 3.000 31.000 0.155
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 2.194 0.242 9.071 0.000 1.702 2.685
Ever Touch? 0.006 0.649 0.010 0.992 -1.312 1.325
Constant 2.457 0.381 6.448 0.000 1.680 3.234
Ever Touch? 0.453 0.691 0.655 0.517 -0.957 1.863
Orienting 0.021 0.019 1.109 0.276 -0.018 0.059
Total Looking Duration -5.701 3.422 -1.666 0.106 -12.680 1.278
Disengagement 0.040 0.208 0.194 0.848 -0.384 0.465
Disgust from Drinking Tap Water R MSE F ∆ df1 df2 p
1 0.182 1.393 1.159 1 34 0.289
2 0.361 1.383 1.156 3 31 0.342
B SE t p 95% CI LB 95% CI UB
Constant 2.677 0.250 10.702 0.000 2.169 3.186
Ever Touch? 0.723 0.671 1.076 0.289 -0.642 2.087
Constant 2.842 0.406 6.994 0.000 2.013 3.670
Ever Touch? 0.905 0.737 1.228 0.229 -0.599 2.408
Orienting 0.020 0.020 1.001 0.324 -0.021 0.061
Total Looking Duration -4.079 3.649 -1.118 0.272 -11.521 3.363
Disengagement 0.222 0.222 1.000 0.325 -0.231 0.675
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Higher fear scores from both interviews combined was associated with greater 
reported fear, r = .438, p = .003, and disgust intensity, r = .411, p = .006, at the thought of 
only having tap water to drink when children were really thirsty. Greater reported fear 
from the BATs was related to greater reported fear, r = .404, p = .007, and disgust, r = 
.573, p < .001, at the thought of only having tap water to drink. Greater reported disgust 
from the BATs was related to greater reported disgust at the thought of only having tap 
water to drink, r = .516, p < .001. Greater avoidance behaviors during the BATs (e.g., 
declining to approach, touch, and/or hold the stimuli) were associated with the belief that 
water from the sink (but not water from the bottle or both) could make people sick, r = -
.266, p = .035. No relations with children’s preferences for bottled over tap water were 
found, suggesting perhaps that underlying differences in negative emotional intensity are 
less strongly linked to preferences for bottled water. Thus, findings provide evidence that 
both children’s negative emotional responses to hypothetical threats and threats presented 
in person are related to the negative emotions they feel about potential real-world threats 
like tap water. Findings also suggest that reporting greater fear might be reflecting an 
over-arching threat bias in general, since reporting greater fear to items presented both 
hypothetically and in-person was associated with greater reported feelings of both fear 
and disgust in response to the thought of drinking tap water.  
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Chapter 4 
Discussion 
A main goal of this dissertation was to improve understanding of children’s 
experiences of low-intensity fear and disgust, which are common parts of their daily lives 
and should carry important consequences for how they feel, think about, and respond to 
potential threats in the real world. A secondary goal was to investigate how individual 
differences in the way children understand, attend to, and experience these distinct threat-
relevant emotions relate to their preferences, beliefs, and emotional responses to a real-
world potential threat. I focused on tap water, because the extent to which children view 
and respond to tap water as a potential threat can carry serious environmental and public 
health consequences. Specifically, I sought to a) document the extent to which children 
differentiated between fear and disgust when presented with potential threat items as a 
novel component of emotion understanding, b) investigate whether facets of children’s 
attention (i.e., orienting, total looking duration, disengagement) differed across a disgust 
or fear context and related to individual differences in how children understand and 
experience fear and disgust, and c) examine whether individual differences in these 
important aspects of emotion development (emotion understanding, attention patterns in 
an evocative context, and subjective experiences of fear and disgust) related to children’s 
water-related drinking preferences, negative emotions, and beliefs. Though several 
interesting findings emerged from this investigation, I did not find support for most of the 
primary hypotheses. Thus, I first summarize the findings for each research question 
briefly, and then proceed to a general discussion of the pattern of results.   
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My first research question was whether there are age-related differences in 
children’s differentiation of fear and disgust. My hypothesis that older children would 
demonstrate more sophisticated emotion understanding and that I would thus see greater 
differentiation between their ratings of fear and disgust with increasing age was not 
supported. I had also hypothesized that children’s understanding of contagion and 
conservation of matter – two markers of cognitive sophistication that are theorized to 
underlie disgust understanding -- would each relate to greater emotion differentiation. 
Neither related to differentiation, and this did not change when I accounted for children’s 
age.  
In addition to these specific hypotheses about the first research question, I 
explored associations between children’s overall self-reported intensity of fear and 
disgust and children’s differentiation of fear and disgust. Less differentiation in response 
to standard fear elicitors (in the KFQ interview) was associated with more intense 
reported disgust in response to these standard fear elicitors, but not more intense feelings 
of fear. Less differentiation of fear and disgust in response to potentially threatening 
stimuli presented to children in person (in the BATs) was associated with more intense 
disgust in response to standard fear elicitors (on the KFQ) but not more intense feelings 
of fear. Finally, less differentiation of fear and disgust in response to the potentially 
threatening stimuli presented to children in person was associated with higher reported 
fear intensity in response to those items. My paradigm allowed me to additionally explore 
whether children’s reported feelings of fear and disgust were more differentiated when 
asked about standard fear-evoking items (the KFQ) compared to standard disgust-
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evoking items (the DES-C). I found that children demonstrated greater differentiation of 
fear and disgust in response to disgust elicitors than fear elicitors. Because I asked 
children how they would feel about typical fear and disgust elicitors both hypothetically, 
in the interviews, and in person, by presenting them with items during the BATs, I could 
also test whether differentiation of fear and disgust differed across “hypothetical” and 
“real-world” threats. I found that children demonstrated less differentiation of fear and 
disgust in response to the items presented in person (i.e., in the real world).  
My second research question examined whether attention patterns vary across fear 
and disgust contexts, and whether these patterns relate to children’s emotional 
responding. I hypothesized that compared to children in the disgust context, children in 
the fear context would demonstrate faster attention orienting to the potentially threatening 
stimulus (e.g., roaring dinosaur or dirty trashcan) and quicker attentional disengagement 
from it, which was not supported. I also explored whether overall time spent looking at 
the potentially threatening stimulus would differ by the free-play emotion context and 
found no differences. Thus, none of the aspects of attention I investigated (e.g., attention 
orienting speed, total looking duration, or speed of attentional disengagement) differed 
across the two discrete emotion potential threat contexts. I had also hypothesized that for 
children assigned to the fear free-play condition (with the roaring dinosaur), attention 
patterns that are typical in response to fear-relevant stimuli (faster attention orienting and 
quicker attentional disengagement from the potentially threatening stimulus) would 
predict greater differentiation of fear and disgust in general. For children assigned to the 
disgust free-play condition (with the dirty trashcan) I predicted that a typical disgust 
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attention pattern (faster attention orienting and slower disengagement from the potentially 
threatening stimulus) would predict greater differentiation of disgust from fear in general. 
Neither of these hypotheses were supported. Finally, I had also hypothesized that 
regardless of free-play condition assignment, patterns of attention that typically reflect 
exaggerated negative emotional responding and hypervigilance to potential threats in the 
environment (quicker attention orienting towards the potentially threatening stimuli, 
longer overall looking duration, or slower attentional disengagement) would relate to 
greater reported fear and disgust intensity in general as well as more avoidance behaviors 
in the BATs, but this was not supported either.  
My last research question investigated whether each of the three facets of emotion 
development I tested – children’s differentiation of fear and disgust, their attention 
patterns in a disgust or fear threat context, and the intensity of their subjective 
experiences of disgust or fear -- related to their preferences for bottled water, negative 
emotions towards the thought of drinking tap water, and beliefs that tap water is 
contaminated. I first explored whether children’s emotion differentiation related to their 
water-related preferences, emotions and beliefs. I found that the less children’s responses 
to items on the standard fear questionnaire (the KFQ) indicated differentiation of fear and 
disgust, the more intense fear they reported at the thought of only having tap water to 
drink if they were really thirsty. Similarly, the less children’s responses to items on the 
standard disgust questionnaire (the DES-C) or items presented in person (the BATs) 
indicated differentiation of fear and disgust, the more intense fear children reported at the 
thought of only having tap water to drink if they were very thirsty. Yet, the extent to 
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which children differentiated between fear and disgust did not relate to greater feelings of 
disgust at the thought of only having tap water to drink if they were really thirsty.  
I next predicted that, irrespective of the threat context (the disgust or fear free-
play), children who demonstrated attention patterns indicative of more exaggerated 
negative emotional responding and hypervigilance (e.g., quicker attention orienting 
towards the potentially threatening stimuli, greater overall time spent looking at the 
potentially threatening stimuli, or slower attentional disengagement from the potentially 
threatening stimuli) would report a preference for bottled water to drink, report more 
intense feelings of fear and disgust at the thought of only having tap water to drink even 
in situations of extreme thirst, and believe that drinking tap water (but not bottled water) 
could make them sick. My hypotheses were not supported. The unique components of 
children’s attention in a potential threat context did not directly relate to their preferences, 
emotions or beliefs in response to a real-world potential threat.  
My final prediction was that children who reported more intense feelings of 
disgust or fear throughout the visit (e.g., children who may be more fearful or disgust-
sensitive) or who demonstrated greater avoidance behaviors when presented with 
evocative stimuli in person would be more averse to tap water – preferring bottled water, 
reporting more intense negative emotions towards the thought of only having tap water to 
drink, and believing that tap water (but not bottled water) was contaminated. Less 
differentiation of fear and disgust related to stronger feelings of both fear and disgust at 
the thought of only having tap water to drink. The intensity with which children reported 
feeling disgusted or scared throughout the visit did not relate strongly to children’s 
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preferences for bottled water. However, in support of hypotheses, both greater reported 
fear intensity and disgust intensity across different indices (e.g., the interviews combined, 
the BATs) predicted greater feelings of both fear and disgust in response to the thought of 
only having tap water to drink when children were really thirsty. In partial support of 
hypotheses, greater avoidance of interacting with the threat-relevant evocative items from 
the BATs predicted the belief that tap water only (and not bottled water) could make you 
sick.   
Are There Age-Related Differences in Children’s Differentiation Between Fear and 
Disgust?  
Differentiation of fear and disgust was not significantly related to children’s 
age. My first question tested whether children’s age related to the extent to which their 
emotion self-reports indicated an underlying awareness of fear and disgust as different in 
contexts of potential threat. Contrary to expectations that I would find a linear 
developmental pattern of greater differentiation with increasing age, no significant 
associations emerged. This could mean that children across all ages of my sample 
indicated similar differentiation of fear and disgust, meaning that this fundamental aspect 
of fear/disgust understanding emerges early and is not meaningfully changing across ages 
4 – 7.  
An alternative explanation for the lack of linear association between age and 
differentiation could be that this sophisticated component of emotion understanding is 
more strongly related to individual differences in children’s unique experiences and 
characteristics than their age. For example, parents socialize their children’s emotions in 
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part by discussing and reminiscing about emotional experiences with them. Greater 
parent-child discussion of emotional experiences, including use of more emotion 
language and discussion of the causes of emotions, predicts children’s more sophisticated 
emotion understanding (Van Bergen & Salmon, 2010). Parent-child conversations foster 
children’s language development, which is also linked to the sophistication in children’s 
emotion understanding (De Stasio, Fjorilli, & Di Chiacchio, 2014; Pons, Lawson, Harris, 
& De Rosnay, 2003). Prior work reveals that 3 to 6-year-old children’s verbal ability 
relates to their emotion understanding, and specifically to their ability to recognize 
emotions and understand the external causes of emotions (De Stasio et al., 2014). In 
addition, children’s own unique characteristics (e.g., trait-level differences in 
psychophysiology, temperament) is also associated with their emotion competency. For 
example, individual differences in children’s resting respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), 
an important indicator of parasympathetic nervous system functioning, relates to 
children’s emotion regulation capacities (Calkins, Graziano, & Keane, 2007; Santucci, 
Silk, Shaw, Gentzler, Fox & Kovacs, 2008). Children who have a higher resting RSA use 
more adaptive emotion regulation strategies than children with a lower resting RSA 
(Santucci et al., 2008). Furthermore, findings from a number of studies suggest that the 
extent to which parent emotion socialization practices relate to children’s understanding, 
expression, and regulation of emotions is qualified by underlying differences in 
children’s vagal tone, an important indicator of their parasympathetic nervous system 
functioning (Hastings & De, 2008; Perry, Calkins, Nelson, Leerkes, & Marcovitch, 
2012). Thus, parent-child emotion socialization practices and individual differences in 
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children’s psychophysiology may be better markers of children’s nuanced emotion 
understanding, and the extent to which they differentiate between fear and disgust, than 
their age.  
Prior research reveals that after age 5, children demonstrate more accurate 
abilities to label specific situations and facial expressions as fear versus disgust, 
suggesting improvements in their comprehension of different threat emotion categories 
and the boundaries between them (Widen & Russell, 2003; Widen & Russell, 2010 a, b; 
Widen, 2013). These findings are why I hypothesized that there would be age-related 
increases in the extent to which children indicate differentiation of fear and disgust 
emotions. But, the majority of this prior work relies on paradigms that ask children to 
identify the emotion evoked by a situation or expression by selecting among a range of 
emotion labels, choosing one (Stein & Levine, 1989; Widen & Russell, 2008; Widen, 
2013), thus testing their explicit knowledge of emotion differences (e.g., out of all these 
different emotions, the facial expression in this picture fits sadness better than fear, anger, 
disgust, or happiness). Had I explicitly asked children about both emotions, for example, 
by asking whether each elicitor was more fear or more disgust evoking (does this make 
you feel more scared or more disgusted?) or asked them to choose one emotion that 
captures how they feel out of several choices, I may have found a linear developmental 
pattern consistent with the emotion identification and labeling research findings. In 
contrast, I asked children to report both how disgusted and how scared each item made 
them feel and used the differences between their ratings to derive an implicit measure of 
differentiation. The extent to which children are reporting that an item or situation made 
  
 
99 
 
them feel disgust or feel fear requires their awareness, insight, and understanding of their 
own subjective emotional experience which varies by person, even in adulthood. For 
example, enhancing adults’ emotion awareness is an important component of many forms 
of mental health therapy (Cheung & Ng, 2019). Thus, another reason I may not have 
found age-related associations is because my derived measure of implicit differentiation 
may inadvertently capture myriad emotional processes. Some of these processes, like 
emotional awareness/insight, would be uniquely informed by individual children’s 
personal characteristics and experiences.  
In interpreting my emotion differentiation findings, it is also important to consider 
what the quantified scores on this measure actually represent. To calculate a measure of 
differentiation I relied on correlations between children’s intensity ratings of fear and 
disgust, and several patterns of response are potentially obscured by this approach. For 
example, high differentiation scores (weaker positive correlations or negative 
correlations) could comprise low consistency in children’s rated fear and disgust in 
response to the different elicitors, as well as more systematic reports of feeling one 
emotion more intensely than the other (more negative correlation values). In contrast, a 
low differentiation score (represented by a stronger positive correlation) could have 
resulted from children feeling either very little of any emotion, or very much of both 
emotions. In future work, it will be important to consider alternative computations of 
differentiation that can better pinpoint the specific pattern of children’s responding, 
providing more nuanced information about whether a specific type of differentiation may 
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be changing across childhood and relating more strongly to other aspects of emotion 
functioning. 
To date, little empirical work has focused on understanding the conceptual 
boundaries between fear and disgust or the extent to which people report experiencing 
both emotions in response to a potential threat. In my study, low emotion differentiation 
scores may not have been a result of difficulty understanding the boundaries between 
discrete emotions, but instead could reflect children reporting that they felt both emotions 
concurrently. Interestingly, a few recent studies with adults proposes the existence of an 
unnamed emotion category that is akin to a blend of fear and disgust, evoked by stimuli 
that have the potential to both transmit disease and pierce the skin (e.g., such as snakes, 
insects, skin lesions, needles). This emotion state often gives people chills and people 
describe it colloquially as giving them the “heebie jeebies” or the “creeps,” (Blake, Yih, 
Zhao, Sung, & Harmon-Jones, 2016; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Summerell, 
2017). It is therefore possible that children who reported both fear and disgust were 
describing this subjective experience – one that we do not have a label for yet in English. 
Future work using an item-level analysis could test whether the extent to which children 
indicate differentiation of fear and disgust varies by the extent to which each item has 
potential to cause immediate physical pain and also spread disease.  
Differentiation was not significantly related to understanding of contagion or 
conservation of matter. I had also hypothesized that components of children’s cognitive 
development which were theorized to be important for a deep understanding of disgust, 
such as their understanding of contagion and conservation of matter (Hejmadi, Rozin, & 
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Siegal, 2004; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Siegal, 1988, Siegal & Share, 1990; Stevenson et al., 
2010) would relate to the extent to which they differentiated between fear and disgust, 
which was not supported. Partialling age also did not substantially change any 
associations between conservation of matter understanding and differentiation. The only 
study I know of that has tested the theoretical assumption that in order to have an 
understanding of disgust children need to understand both contagion (e.g., germs can be 
spread through contact) and conservation of matter (amount of matter remains the same, 
even if it appears different in shape or form) was done by Stevenson and colleagues 
(2010). Stevenson found that even toddlers engage in avoidance behaviors in the 
presence of typical disgust elicitors. Furthermore, older children who understood 
contagion and conservation of matter and those who did not demonstrated typical 
avoidance behaviors, suggesting that this level of cognitive sophistication is not needed 
to appraise a stimulus as a potential threat and avoid it. However, although behavioral 
avoidance suggests an item is perceived as aversive and potentially threatening, 
avoidance in response to a disgust elicitor does not mean that children felt “disgust”. My 
null findings suggest that at least across the ages of 4 to 7, an understanding of contagion 
and conservation of matter – cognitive components that are important for understanding 
that coming into contact with contaminated items can spread pathogens and produce 
illness and infection – is not related to whether or not children report feeling different 
threat-relevant emotions (e.g., differentiation) in response to typical fear and disgust 
elicitors. Perhaps in future work, asking children why they find something disgusting 
(e.g., ability to spread germs and disease, resembles items that could carry germs/spread 
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illness, reminds us of our animal nature) or scary (e.g., because it could hurt me, because 
it is dangerous) might better help clarify why children demonstrate more or less 
differentiation of threat-relevant emotion experiences.  
Taken together, this set of null findings suggests that neither children’s biological 
age nor components of their cognitive sophistication (i.e., contagion or conservation 
understanding), related to differentiation of fear and disgust. Investigating individual 
differences, like parent emotion socialization and psychophysiology, as well as assessing 
children’s reasoning for reporting fear or disgust may be important for better clarifying 
what influences differentiation of threat relevant emotions across ages 4 to 7.  
Differentiation did relate to the intensity of reported disgust or fear. Although I 
did not have specific hypotheses, I explored the extent to which children’s differentiation 
of fear and disgust in response to discrete types of threats (e.g., fear elicitors from the 
KFQ and disgust elicitors from the DES-C) related to their reported feelings of fear and 
disgust throughout the study. Children who indicated less differentiation of fear and 
disgust in response to typical fear elicitors (e.g., the KFQ), meaning that they provided 
more consistent ratings of both fear and disgust, reported more intense feelings of disgust 
in response to these fear elicitors. This suggests that a pattern of low differentiation in 
response to the typical fear elicitors was due to children reporting them as evoking more 
intense feelings of both fear and disgust.  
In general, children reported greater disgust than fear in response to the 
potentially threatening items presented to them in person (the BATs). Related to this, I 
found that children who indicated less differentiation of fear and disgust when asked 
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about typical fear elicitors hypothetically (the KFQ) reported greater fear when presented 
with potentially threatening items in person (the BATs). Together, these findings indicate 
that children who are reporting more similar fear and disgust ratings in response to 
hypothetical fear elicitors are perhaps interpreting the items as posing a more substantial 
threat. Hypervigilance to interpret ambiguous situations as threatening is a marker of 
different forms of anxiety disorders (Richards, Benson, Donnelly, & Hadwin, 2014). So, 
less differentiated feelings of fear and disgust regardless of the immediacy of the threat 
posed (e.g., hypothetical or in person threats) could represent more threat-biased 
emotional responding, providing an early marker of risk for later anxiety development. I 
also found that less differentiation of fear and disgust when presented with threat relevant 
items in person related to greater reported fear in response to those items, suggesting that 
this differentiation pattern was due to children reporting intense feelings of both fear and 
disgust and interpreting the situation as posing a greater threat more broadly. In contrast, 
greater differentiation of fear and disgust in response to typical fear elicitors (e.g., the 
KFQ) related to greater reported disgust when presented with items in person (e.g., the 
BATs). Children overall reported greater disgust than fear in response to items from the 
BATs. Thus, children who were perhaps more “accurately” reporting stronger fear than 
disgust in response to typical (hypothetical) fear elicitors were also more accurately 
reporting that items from the BATs were more disgusting than scary, suggesting a more 
correct assessment of the types and extent of threats posed.  
Differentiation in response to disgust elicitors was greater than differentiation 
in response to fear elicitors. Findings from the exploratory paired t-test comparisons I 
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ran to test whether differentiation was greater in response to typical fear vs. disgust 
elicitors (the KFQ vs the DES-C) also supports the interpretation that children’s 
appraisals of the severity of the threat posed played a role in the extent to which they 
differentiated fear and disgust. I found that children showed greater differentiation 
between fear and disgust in response to typical disgust elicitors (e.g., the DES-C) than in 
response to typical fear elicitors (e.g., the KFQ).  
Disgust is a feeling evoked in response to a less immediate/impending threat than 
fear.  People can engage in hygiene or health promoting behaviors to neutralize the 
threats that disgust elicitors pose, such as by wearing gloves, washing hands, or taking 
medicines (Curtis & Biran, 2001), making the perceived consequences of engaging with 
them less concerning than the consequences of engaging with things that typically elicit 
fear. Furthermore, some research suggests overlap between certain types of disgust and 
feelings of amusement (e.g., children are amused by poop or insects; Hemenover 
& Schimmack, 2007;  McGraw & Warren, 2010). To the extent that disgusting items are 
perceived as less threatening (as they should be) or a disgusting item evokes positive 
feelings as well, then the perceived severity of threat the disgusting item poses should be 
reduced.  It may be easier for children to be aware of and more clearly identify and 
distinguish between the specific threat relevant emotions they feel when the elicitor is 
perceived as posing less of a threat. This could be why differentiation was greater in 
response to typical disgust elicitors than fear elicitors.  
Differentiation in response to hypothetical threats was greater than 
differentiation in response to items presented in person. Further support for the idea that 
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differentiation is greater in response to the perception of a less severe threat comes from 
the finding that differentiation in response to items presented to children hypothetically 
(i.e., in the interviews) was greater than differentiation in response to the potentially 
threatening items they were presented with in person (e.g., from the BATs).  In contexts 
where the potential consequences of engagement with the threat may be perceived to be 
more immediate and severe, children’s responses indicated less differentiation of threat-
relevant emotions. Of note, this also suggests that the extent to which a child appraises a 
potentially threatening situation as having a more severe or imminent consequence might 
explain individual differences in differentiation and the intensity of emotions that 
children feel. Furthermore, the extent to which children differentiate between fear and 
disgust in response to an ambiguous or potentially threatening situation likely reflects 
individual differences in their threat severity assessments or appraisals. Children who 
appraise an ambiguous or potential threat situation as posing a more severe threat 
demonstrate less differentiation of threat-relevant emotions.   
Do attention patterns vary across fear and disgust contexts or relate to children’s 
emotional responding?    
Patterns of attention did not vary by threat context or relate to differentiation. 
Drawing on prior work examining components of attention using computer-based 
reaction-time tasks (Charash & McKay, 2002; Van Hooff, Devue, Vieweg, & Theeuwes, 
2013), I hypothesized that children’s attention would look different across a fear and 
disgust context (e.g., dinosaur or trashcan free-play). However, my prediction that 
children would demonstrate quicker attention orienting and disengagement in a fear 
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context than in a disgust context was not supported. I found no differences in how 
quickly children oriented their attention towards the potentially threatening stimulus (e.g., 
dinosaur or trashcan), the overall proportion of time they spent looking at it, or in how 
quickly they disengaged their attention from the potential threat after first looking at it.  
In a similar vein, I had also hypothesized that attention patterns that are more 
stereotypic of each type of threat would predict children’s greater differentiation of fear 
and disgust. Thus, faster attention orienting and disengagement in the fear context (the 
dinosaur free-play), which is typical in response to fear elicitors (Charash & McKay, 
2002; Van Hooff, Devue, Vieweg, & Theeuwes, 2013) would relate to greater 
differentiation of fear and disgust. In addition, faster attention orienting but slower 
disengagement in the disgust context (the trashcan free-play) would also predict greater 
differentiation. However, I found no support for these predictions either.  
Because the majority of work on attention across fear and disgust contexts has 
used reaction times in computerized tasks, the first explanation I can forward for this lack 
of hypothesized effects is that in the real world there may not be large differences in how 
people direct their attention towards different types of threats. Second, the manipulation 
check suggests that a substantial proportion of children found both the dinosaur and the 
trashcan to be disgusting as well as scary. Whereas children found the garbage can more 
disgusting than scary, they rated the dinosaur as being equally disgusting and scary. Thus, 
children experienced similar emotions in the two contexts and the lack of free-play 
condition differences could be because both contexts evoked similar negative emotions 
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and were perhaps thus appraised as being highly similar in terms of the 
severity/imminence of threat they posed.    
An alternative explanation is that the paradigm (free-play; perturbation; free-play) 
evoked a stronger and more robust response across participants than the specific emotion 
evoked by the stimulus. In other words, children in both free-play conditions experienced 
an unexpected activation of a potentially threatening item in the room, and this task 
demand blotted out the more subtle discrete emotion effects of the novel stimuli. To the 
extent that children’s appraisals of the threat severity of this situation were similar across 
conditions, and they were all responding to the recognition of a general threat instead of a 
nuanced distinction of the type of threat posed, there would be no attention pattern 
differences. Because the novel stimuli used in both free-play contexts were negatively 
valenced objects, I am unable to determine whether the novelty and unexpectedness of 
the active stimulus is what produced a similar attention pattern or whether the similar 
pattern was because children perceived the ambiguous contexts as similarly threatening. 
A comparison condition with a positive active stimulus (e.g., a colorful neighing unicorn) 
would help to determine whether the attention patterns did not differ because of novelty 
or because both situations were perceived as similarly threatening.  
Attention patterns did not relate to children’s self-reported fear and disgust 
intensity. Based on previous work on anxiety linking specific attention patterns to 
exaggerated negative emotional responding, I predicted that children who reported 
greater disgust or fear intensity would a) demonstrate quicker attention orienting towards 
the potentially threatening stimulus, or b) demonstrate a longer overall proportion of time 
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spent looking at the potentially threatening stimulus or c) demonstrate slower attention 
disengagement after first looking at the potentially threatening stimulus (Pérez-Edgar, 
Bar-Haim, McDermott, Chronis-Tuscano, Pine, & Fox, 2010; Rothbart & Derryberry, 
1981; Schechner et al., 2012). I did not find support for these hypothesized associations.  
It is important to mention that the current study is the first to examine patterns of 
attention across different emotion contexts using an ambulatory mobile eye-tracking 
paradigm. The majority of work examining how attention patterns relate to individual 
differences in emotion responding have relied on computer-based paradigms that measure 
reaction time data recorded in milliseconds (Pérez-Edgar et al., 2010; Perez-Edgar et al., 
2014; Schechner et al., 2012), and thus lack ecological validity. Studies that have 
examined attention using more ecologically valid novel free-play paradigms with 
evocative stimuli, similar to what I did, have primarily been conducted with toddlers and 
very young children. In this work, however, attention is captured more globally by 
recording how many seconds a child’s head is directed towards or away from an 
evocative stimulus or by using a Likert scale to make a global assessment of attention. 
Thus, ecologically valid measures of children’s attention in affective contexts often lack 
precision in their estimates of what, specifically, children’s visual attention is focused on 
and for how long (Buss & Goldsmith, 1998; Kiel & Buss, 2011; Waters & Kershaw, 
2015). Improving on these prior investigations, I used mobile eye tracking to measure 
millisecond level shifts in attention in a real-world context that allowed for precision in 
both the specific item children focused their visual attention on, when they did so, and 
how long. These measurement differences could explain in part why I did not find the 
  
 
109 
 
previously documented associations between attention and children’s emotional 
responding. One study with 5- to 7-year-old children published very recently did use 
mobile eye tracking in a real-world ambiguous threat context and investigated whether 
different patterns of attention would be demonstrated by children characterized as being 
more or less behaviorally inhibited (e.g., extreme shyness), a risk factor for development 
of social anxiety (Fu, Nelson, Borge, Buss, & Perez-Edgar, 2019). These authors 
measured some similar components and patterns of attention in a potential threat situation 
as I did and tested whether attention was linked to individual differences in children’s 
negative emotionality and also found no associations.  
Children’s ability to manage, control, and direct their own attention in response to 
a threat is an important component of the emotion regulation process (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007; Gross, 1998; Gross 2015; Mauss et al., 2007). Disengaging attention 
from a negative emotional stimulus – distraction -- is a typical emotion regulation 
strategy that is demonstrated throughout childhood and is common in adulthood as well 
(Gross, 1998; 2015; Sillars & Davis, in prep, Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner, 2011). But, 
the same attention pattern may represent poorer or more effective underlying emotion 
regulation. For example, longer time spent looking at the potentially threatening stimulus 
could have been because children were interested in it to begin with and were better able 
to regulate any negative emotions evoked from being initially startled by it once it 
became active. Yet, this same attention pattern also could have been because children felt 
threatened by the potentially threatening stimulus to such an extent that they were unable 
to withdraw their attention from it. Similarly, less time spent looking at the potentially 
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threatening stimulus overall could be because children were able to effectively disengage 
their attention from the threat, reflecting better emotion regulation. However, this same 
attention pattern could arise from children feeling such intense negative emotions that 
they could not look at the stimulus. To the extent that the same attention pattern 
represents different underlying emotional experiences, and could widely be influenced by 
individual differences in children’s effectiveness of emotion regulation, I would not find 
a main effect of the attention indices I used and fear or disgust intensity.  
In future planned extensions of my dissertation work, I plan to use the recording 
from the overhead cameras to code a variety of children’s behaviors from the free-play, 
such as the severity of behavioral distress (e.g., tense body posture, rigid motion), 
proximity to the stimulus (e.g., maintaining distance vs. remaining or moving closer), the 
vigor with which they played with the free-play toys (e.g., the extent to which children 
continued to actively play with the toys in the room after the stimulus became active), 
and the presence of smiling. I hope to leverage these indices of children’s emotion 
experience and measures of their cardiac physiology to better contextualize and tease 
apart profiles of attention during these episodes. For instance, this approach would allow 
me to potentially distinguish between children who stared at the stimulus because they 
felt threatened by it versus those who stared at the stimulus because they found it 
amusing. These more nuanced attention regulation profiles will likely relate to aspects of 
children’s emotional responding more broadly, such as the intensity with which 
individual children reported feeling disgust or fear.  
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Do Aspects of Children’s Emotion Development Relate to Their Water-Related 
Preferences, Emotions, and Beliefs?  
The perception of tap water as a potential threat should be heavily influenced by 
individual appraisals. That is, tap water does not represent a specific discrete emotion 
context. Unlike encountering a burglar (e.g., a fear context) or vomit (e.g., a disgust 
context) it is not clear that tap water ought to evoke any particular negative emotion (or 
any emotional reaction at all).  Thus, to answer my last research question I used versions 
of the emotion and attention measures that collapsed across the discrete emotion contexts 
(emotion differentiation and overall fear and disgust ratings from the interviews 
combined; differentiation scores and fear and disgust ratings from the BATs).  
Less differentiation was association with more intense negative emotions at the 
thought of only having tap water to drink. I first explored whether differentiation of fear 
and disgust related to drinking water preferences, negative emotions about tap water, and 
beliefs that water is contaminated (e.g., that it can make you sick). I found no 
associations between differentiation and children’s preferences for drinking bottled water. 
The lack of association between this aspect of children’s emotion understanding and their 
reports that bottled water is better could be that a preference for bottled water is likely 
related to a number of factors beyond just emotion-related appraisals. For example, 
preferences could be reflecting preferred tastes, convenience, or children merely enjoying 
the experience of drinking out of a water bottle.  
I did find that less differentiation, regardless of the assessment measure I used to 
compute it (e.g., the interviews, the BATs), was associated with greater reported feelings 
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of fear at the thought of being very thirsty and only having tap water to drink. 
Interestingly, less differentiation did not predict greater disgust at the thought of being 
very thirsty and only having tap water to drink. Children reported greater disgust than 
fear at the thought of only having tap water to drink if they were really thirsty. So, it is 
not the case that in general the thought of drinking tap water makes children more scared 
than disgusted. However, children who reported greater fear at the thought of only having 
tap water to drink if they were really thirsty also reported greater disgust.  
Considering these findings along with the differentiation and emotion intensity 
results from my first research question suggests that children who are differentiating less 
between fear and disgust may be interpreting potential real-world threats as more 
imminent or severe, as evidenced by the greater reports of fear at the thought of drinking 
tap water – an emotion evoked in response to elicitors that pose a more immediate or 
severe threat to bodily harm. It is important to note that this follow-up question of how 
scared children would feel if they only had tap water to drink was only asked of children 
who had previously responded that even in situations of extreme thirst (e.g., “when you 
are REALLY thirsty”) bottled water would be better than tap water. This suggests that 
having a threat-bias predicts stronger feelings of fear to tap water even in situations 
where children might be very thirsty and in need of water. Fear is a powerful motivator of 
avoidance behaviors. To the extent that these more extreme feelings of fear contribute to 
children’s avoidance of drinking water, they may carry serious health consequences. 
Future work should therefore try to assess the real-world health-related consequences of 
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children’s underlying understanding of fear and disgust. Importantly, my findings reveal 
that fears of drinking tap water need to be addressed early in development.  
Attention patterns were not significantly related to children’s water-related 
preferences, emotions, or beliefs. I had hypothesized that attention patterns that typically 
characterize negative emotional responding (e.g., quicker attention orienting, longer total 
looking duration, or slower attention disengagement; Bar-Haim, 2010; Rothbart & 
Derryberry, 1981; Schechner et al., 2012) would relate to preferences for drinking bottled 
water, greater negative emotions towards drinking tap water, and the belief that tap water 
is contaminated, which was not supported. As explained earlier, I believe that a main 
reason why I did not see associations between children’s attention patterns and their 
beliefs and emotions towards this real-world potential threat is because the same attention 
pattern could reflect different underlying emotion experiences. In order to more fully 
capture how attention patterns relate to emotion experiences, one approach would be to 
consider whether a given attention pattern was a result of more or less effective emotion 
regulation and separate out an attention outcome that is the result of more or less 
effective regulation. In future extensions of this work, I also plan to investigate whether 
unique attention regulation profiles can be established and to what extent these attention 
regulation profiles are reflective of how children are interpreting and appraising real 
world threats, which should therefore relate to their negative emotions and beliefs about 
tap water.  
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More intense feelings of fear and disgust related to stronger negative emotions 
about tap water  
My final hypothesis was that greater reported fear or disgust intensity would 
relate to children’s preferences for bottled water, more intense feelings of disgust or fear 
at the thought of only having tap water to drink in a situation of extreme thirst, and the 
belief that tap water only (but not bottled water) could make you sick. I did not find any 
associations between the intensity of children’s reported fear and disgust and children’s 
preferences for bottled water. Again, this is likely because a number of factors that are 
not heavily tied to children’s negative emotional responses (e.g., taste preferences, 
convenience) are likely motivating preferences.  
Greater disgust intensity and greater fear intensity, regardless of the assessment 
measure I used (e.g., the interviews, BATs) each independently predicted greater reported 
fear at the thought of only having tap water to drink if children were really thirsty as well 
as greater reported disgust. This suggests that children who have greater threat biases in 
general, as evidenced by relatively greater reported disgust or fear intensity in response to 
hypothetical (e.g., the interviews) and potential threats presented in person (e.g., the 
BATs) are attributing both threat relevant emotions to the experience of drinking tap 
water. Thus, even at very young ages, children’s general threat-biases may already be 
playing a role in their appraisals of tap water as a substantial threat.   
Interestingly, greater reported fear in response to the potentially threatening items 
presented to children in person (e.g., during the BATs, which were rated overall as more 
disgust-evoking) related to greater feelings of both fear and disgust towards the thought 
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of only having tap water to drink if children were very thirsty. Yet, greater reported 
disgust to the potentially threatening items presented in person only predicted greater 
disgust towards the thought of only having tap water to drink. Mean level analyses 
revealed that in general, children found the BAT items to be more disgusting than scary. 
So, reporting greater fear in response to these items may be more reflective of a general 
threat bias whereas greater disgust in response to the BAT items may reflect more disgust 
sensitivity, specifically. I also found that greater avoidance of the potentially threatening 
items presented to children in person (e.g., BATs) related to the belief that water from the 
sink, but not water from the tap could make people sick. Although I did not assess the 
extent to which children actually avoid drinking tap water, this finding suggests that even 
young children are holding beliefs that drinking tap water can make them sick and this 
belief might relate to their avoidance of drinking tap water.  
Thus, from young ages children are already developing beliefs that tap water is 
disgusting, scary, and can make them sick. The beliefs and emotions they feel towards 
this potential threat are related to individual differences in children’s understanding of 
fear and disgust and individual differences in how intensely they feel each emotion, 
implicating a general role of threat bias in children’s early attitudes towards tap water. 
The finding that less differentiation of fear and disgust related to stronger feelings of both 
fear and disgust at the thought of only having tap water to drink is important. The bulk of 
work on emotions underlying water-related beliefs and behaviors suggests that disgust 
underlies adult’s rejection of novel wastewater treatment solutions and tap water 
(McLeod et al., 2015; Rozin, Haddad, Nemeroff, & Slovic, 2015; Wester et al., 2016). 
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My work suggests that both fear and disgust threat-relevant emotions may be important 
in understanding why some people have such strong reactions towards tap water and 
reject it. Furthermore, recent work suggests that among adults, more intense feelings of 
the emotional experience I described earlier as the “heebie jeebies”, a blend of both fear 
and disgust, relates to their strongest opposition and rejection of genetically modified 
foods and novel technologies (Royzman, Cusimano, & Leeman, 2017). My findings with 
children in part parallel this work.  To promote more sustainable water consumption 
behaviors and acceptance of cost effective and efficient water solutions, water education 
programs and campaigns may want to start early, targeting the emotions and threat 
appraisals of very young audiences.  
Limitations  
Several limitations of this study bear mention. First, it must be noted that the 
sample size is relatively small and findings must be interpreted with caution. Second, 
although I can infer from the correlations between my differentiation measure and 
children’s fear and disgust intensities that much of the lower differentiation scores was 
from greater reported intensity of both emotions, the differentiation measure I used 
obscures understanding of how each unique differentiation situation (e.g., low reports of 
both emotions, high reports of both emotions, less systematic pattern of reporting each 
emotion, opposite patterns of reporting each emotion) might relate to other aspects of 
children’s emotion understanding. Third, because my only measure of emotion 
understanding was the extent to which children reported fear and disgust in response to 
different types of elicitors I am unable to rule out that my results are due to children’s 
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difficulties with understanding the boundaries between fear and disgust. Future work 
should not only assess differentiation implicitly, like I did here, but also assess explicit 
differentiation and the extent to which children understand that a situation or a specific 
elicitor may be more disgust or fear evoking. An analysis of the extent to which each 
item that children were presented with has the potential to a) pierce the skin and b) spread 
disease, virus or infection would be fruitful to pursue. This item by item analysis 
combined with an assessment of the extent to which children rated each as being scary or 
disgusting might help pinpoint whether there are specific categories of evocative 
situations or stimuli that evoke both fear and disgust from most children. This could 
provide novel insight into the extent to which children demonstrate experiences and 
awareness of this potentially new “heebie jeebie” discrete emotion category and clarify to 
what extent children are aware of the boundaries of fear and disgust.   
This study did not investigate how differences in children’s characteristics and 
experiences relate to the extent to which they indicate differentiation of fear and disgust. 
Perhaps individual differences in children’s psychophysiology or parent emotion 
socialization practices might more strongly relate to individual differences in the extent to 
which children are differentiating between their different emotions in early childhood 
than their age. I was also not able to establish whether greater or less emotion 
differentiation is the more adaptive pattern for children of these ages. It might be that 
greater differentiation in a disgust context but less differentiation in a fear or more 
powerful threat context, which reflects the general pattern that I found when comparing 
mean level differentiation across measures, is more adaptive. To assess whether there is a 
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more adaptive differentiation pattern in childhood, future work could assess children’s 
mental health symptoms and test whether different types of differentiation (e.g., more or 
less in response to specific emotion contexts, reporting more intense feelings of both 
emotions, reporting less intense of both emotions, etc) relate to more or less mental health 
symptoms. Given that fear and disgust are both believed to underlie certain categories of 
mental health problems, like obsessive compulsive disorder and specific phobias that can 
onset in childhood (Buss & Kiel, 2013, Kessler et al., 2005, 2007, Olatunji, Cisler, 
McKay & Phillips, 2010; Olatunji, Lohr, Sawchuk, & Tolin, 2007), understanding to 
what extent these different mental health symptoms are predicted by different 
differentiation patterns in response to different types of threat contexts (e.g., disgust, fear, 
“heebie jeebies”) could pinpoint more fine-grained emotion understanding processes to 
target in intervention work. 
Because my free-play paradigm only included two different negative emotion 
contexts I am unable to speak to whether I did not find attention differences because 
children did not feel substantially different emotions in response to the dinosaur versus 
trashcan or because the overall novelty and unexpectedness of the activated potentially 
threatening stimulus in the free-play paradigm produced a stronger negative emotional 
experience that obscured the influence of emotions that the stimulus evoked on its own. 
Future work comparing attention across different negative emotion contexts should also 
include a positive emotion condition to improve interpretability of findings and the ability 
to attribute the results to specific emotion contexts.  
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Finally, although I demonstrated that children can have strong negative emotional 
reactions to tap-water I did not assess the actual real-world health-related impact this 
might have on young children’s lives. Future work should assess to what extent 
children’s early fear and disgust towards the thought of drinking tap water impacts 
whether they actually drink water in everyday life.  
Conclusions 
This study made several novel contributions to the scientific understanding of 
children’s emotion development. First, findings suggest that children differentiate 
between feelings of fear and disgust in response to potential threats from very young ages 
(e.g., 4 years). Second, children appear to differentiate more between fear and disgust in 
response to disgust elicitors than they do fear elicitors and, differentiate more in response 
to elicitors asked in an interview rather than presented in person. These patterns suggest 
that the appraisal of the severity or immediacy of the perceived threat might be playing a 
role in the extent to which children differentiate between fear and disgust, with less 
differentiation documented in contexts of greater potential threat severity. Third, I did not 
find any attention pattern differences across two different threat contexts in one of the 
first studies to use mobile eye tracking to examine links between attention and 
components of children’s emotion responding. Finally, I found that early individual 
differences in children’s understanding of fear and disgust (assessed via differentiation) 
related to their beliefs and emotions about drinking tap water. Children who showed less 
differentiation between their feelings of fear and disgust may be generating more severe 
appraisals of real-world potential threat situations, like drinking tap water. Greater 
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avoidance of items that children generally deemed as being more disgusting related to the 
belief that only tap water could make children sick. Results from this dissertation thus 
suggest that feelings of fear and disgust about tap water and perceptions of municipal tap 
water as posing a substantial threat should be addressed very early in development in 
order to promote effective acceptance of more sustainable water reuse solutions among 
the general public.  
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Appendix A 
Full Procedures for Larger Study 
1. Greeting & introduction  
2. Consent and assent procedures  
3. Emotion face scales training  
4. Emotion self-report 1 
5. Hedonic like/dislike scale training  
6. Electrode placement for mom and child  
7. Cardiac electrode acclimation  
8. Dyadic cardiac baseline 1  
9. Cardiac baseline 1  
10. Emotion self-report 2 
11. Computer tasks (Flanker & Posner)  
12. Emotion self-report 3 
13. Cardiac baseline 2  
14. KFQ & DES-C interviews  
15. Cardiac baseline 3 
16. Emotion self-report 4 
17. Contagion, conservation, and conformity interview  
18. Tap water interview  
19. Emotion self-report 5 
20. Cardiac baseline 4  
21. Eye-tracking placement/Calibration #1 & Cardiac baseline 5 for parent only  
22. Free-play child alone   
23. Emotion self-report 6 
24. Free-play with parent  
25. Emotion self-report 7 
26. Calibration # 2 & eye-tracking removal  
27. Dyadic free-play conversation task  
28. Dyadic cardiac baseline 3  
29. Emotion self-report 8 
30. BAT tasks  
31. Emotion self-report 9 
32. Dyadic BAT conversation task  
33. Dyadic cardiac baseline 4  
34. Emotion self-report 10 
35. Recovery -- 2 min sitting 
36. Electrode removal  
37. Prizes & debriefing  
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Appendix B 
Procedure Order for Dissertation 
1. Greeting & introduction  
2. Consent and assent procedures  
3. Emotion face scales training  
4. KFQ & DES-C interviews  
5. Contagion, conservation, and conformity interview  
6. Tap water interview  
7. Eye-tracking placement/Calibration #1  
8. Free-play child alone   
9. Calibration # 2 & eye-tracking removal  
10. BAT tasks  
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Appendix C 
Emotion Report Scales  
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Appendix D 
Emotion Report Scales Training Procedure 
 “Today we are going to play a lot of different games, and sometimes we will ask you to 
tell us what you are feeling”.  
 
Show SCARED face scale and say: “You can use these faces to tell me how scared you 
feel at different times today, ok? So, if you feel ‘Not At All’ scared, you point to this one 
(point to 1st face). If you feel ‘A Little Scared’ you point to this one (point to 2nd face). If 
you feel ‘Pretty Much Scared’ you point to this one (point to 3rd face). But if you feel 
‘Very’ scared, you point here (point to 4th). Now you try it - show me where you point if 
you feel ‘A LITTLE’ scared.” (Correct if wrong.)  
 
 
Show DISGUST face scale and says: “You can use these faces to tell me how Grossed 
out or Disgusted you feel at different times today, ok? So if you feel ‘Not At All’ Grossed 
out or Disgusted , you point to this one (point to 1st face). If you feel ‘A Little Grossed 
out or Disgusted ’ you point to this one (point to 2nd face). If you feel ‘Pretty Much 
Grossed out or Disgusted ’ you point to this one (point to 3rd face). But if you feel ‘Very’ 
Grossed out or Disgusted , you point here. Now you try it - show me where you point if 
you feel ‘VERY’ Grossed out or Disgusted .” (Correct if wrong.)  
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Appendix E  
Items from the KFQ  
 “Okay, now I am going to say a bunch of things. For each thing I say, I want you to 
show me how scared it makes you feel and then I will also ask you how disgusted or 
grossed out it makes you feel. So for example, if I say “eating a tasty pie”, I want you to 
show me if that makes you feel not at all scared, a little scared, pretty much scared or 
very scared. [point to each corresponding face]. Ok? So now you show me. Eating a tasty 
pie. How scared does that make you feel?” [allow C to point to Koala face]. Great! Now, 
eating a taste pie, how disgusted does it make you feel?     
                                             
1. A frightening movie 
2. Rats or mice 
3. Ghosts 
4. Witches 
6. Being teased by other kids 
7. Lions 
8.  Getting sick 
9. Getting lost and not seeing your parents anymore 
10. Being hit by a car 
11. Hearing your parents arguing 
12.  Being high in the sky 
13.  Snakes 
14. Being in the dark 
15.  A man who wants to take you away (a kidnapper) 
16. A burglar breaking into your house 
17. Thunderstorms 
19. Roller coaster 
20. Scary dreams 
21. Flying in an airplane 
23.  Fire 
25. War 
26. Spiders  
27. Death 
28. Getting a shot 
29. Crocodiles 
30. Blood  
31. Parents getting divorced 
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Appendix F  
Items from the DES-C 
1. A glass of spoiled milk that has gone bad 
2. A hamburger turned green with age 
3. An old cup of coffee with green mold in it 
4. A slice of bread with green mold on it (rotting foods) 
5. A pile of rotting lettuce 
6. Having blood drawn from your arm  
7. Receiving a needle injection in the arm (body envelope) 
8. A bottle with your blood 
9. A small tube of your blood 
10. Handling an injection needle, like the kind a nurse uses 
11. Receiving a needle injection in the mouth like when you are at the dentist 
18. The smell of throw up  
20. The dead body of a dog that has been run over  
21. A person hurt in a car accident 
22. Seeing a surgery operation happen, like someone getting a new eye (body 
violation) 
23. Pictures of hurt soldiers 
24. A dead person that you don’t know 
25. A dead animal lying on the road for some time 
28. The sight of a large slug  
29. A piece of rotting steak 
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Appendix G 
Contagion Task  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Show a 
cartoon image 
of a sick boy, 
Timmy, in bed] 
 
[Show a 
cartoon image 
of the same 
boy, Timmy, 
having a 
tantrum] 
[Show a 
cartoon image 
of a different 
boy sick in 
bed] 
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Appendix H 
Water Conservation Task  
    
 
Step 1. Here is a glass of water Step 2. Now a teaspoon of sugar is 
being added. 
 
   
 
Step 3. And it is getting stirred 
together.  
Step 4. I want to know what YOU 
think. Why can’t we see the sugar 
anymore? “Did it break into tiny 
pieces we can’t see or did it just 
turn into plain water?”  
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Appendix I  
Water Interview  
[Start by showing children side by side images of water from the sink (tap water) and 
water from a bottle (bottled water)] Keep the images side by side on the table during the 
entire water interview.  
 
E1: Both of these are pictures of water. This is water from the sink (point to picture). This 
is water from a bottle (point to picture).  
I want to know what you think. Which water is better? Is water from the sink better to 
drink, is water from a bottle better to drink, or are they both the same? Point to which 
water you think is better: this one, this one, or both? [allow C to respond]  
 
What about when you are REALLY thirsty? When you are REALLY THIRSTY, what do 
you think? Is water from the SINK better to drink (point to picture), is water from a bottle 
better to drink (point to picture), or are they both the same to drink? Point to which water 
you think is better when you are really thirsty: this one, this one, or both? 
[allow C to respond[ 
 
If child picks both, jump to THOUGHTS ABOUT SICKNESS. If not, proceed.  
 
“What if you were REALLY THIRSTY, but all you had to drink was [undesirable water 
source]. How SCARED would you feel if you only had ____(undesirable water source) 
water to drink when you were really thirsty (show SCARED scale)? Not At All (point), A 
Little (point), Pretty Much (point), or Very (point)? [c responds]  
 
“What if you were REALLY THIRSTY, but all you had to drink was [undesirable water 
source]. How DISGUSTED would you feel if you only had ____(undesirable water 
source) water to drink when you were really thirsty (show DISGUST scale)? Not At All 
(point), A Little (point), Pretty Much (point), or Very (point)? [c responds]  
 
 
PART 2. THOUGHTS ABOUT SICKNESS  
  
Now I have one more question about what YOU think. Do you think water can ever make 
people sick? Can water from the sink make someone sick? Can water from a bottle make 
someone sick? Or can they both make someone sick? [allow C to respond].  
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Appendix J 
Free-play Room Setup 
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Appendix K  
Free-play Room Stimuli  
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Appendix L 
Behavioral Avoidance Task Procedure  
I am going to show you a bunch of things now and ask you some questions about 
them.  
 
BAT 1. Rock.  
Here is a rock. When you look at this rock, how [“scared”, “grossed out or 
disgusted”] do you feel?” Would you like to come here to have a closer look? Would 
you like to touch this rock? Would you like to hold this rock? [return C back to 
seat]. Okay, I am going to ask you to go back and sit on your seat while I get the 
next thing ready.  
 
BAT 2. Juice with Leaves. 
Here is a cup of juice and here are some leaves. I am going to put these leaves in 
this cup of juice. When you look at this juice, how [“scared”, “grossed out or 
disgusted”] do you feel? Would you like to come here to have a closer look? 
Would you like to touch this juice? Would you like to drink this juice if you were 
careful not to drink the leaves?  
 
BAT 3. Used Tissue.    
Here is somebody’s used tissue. When you look at this tissue, how [“scared”, 
“grossed out or disgusted”] do you feel?” Would you like to come here to have a 
closer look?  
Would you like to touch this tissue? Would you like to hold this tissue?  
[return C back to seat]. Okay, I am going to ask you to go back and sit on your 
seat while I get the next thing ready.  
 
BAT 4. Maggot/Mealworms.  
Here are a bunch of maggots. When you look at these maggots, how [“scared”, 
“grossed out or disgusted”] do you feel? Would you like to come here to have a closer 
look?  
Would you like to touch these maggots? Would you like to hold these maggots?  
[return C back to seat]. Okay, I am going to ask you to go back and sit on your 
seat while I get the next thing ready.  
 
BAT 5. Glass eye.  
Here is a glass eye. When someone loses an eye, say in a bad accident, they put in 
a glass eye – into the eye socket – just like this one.  [gesture by pointing to your 
eye].  
When you look at this glass eye, how [“scared”, “grossed out or disgusted”] do you 
feel?”.   
Would you like to come here to have a closer look? Would you like to touch this glass 
eye?  
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Would you like to hold this glass eye? [return C back to seat]. Okay, I am going to 
ask you to go back and sit on your seat while I get the next thing ready.  
 
BAT 6. Moldy bread.  
Here is some moldy bread. When you look at this moldy bread, how [“scared”, 
“grossed out or disgusted”] do you feel?” Would you like to come here to have a 
closer look?  
Would you like to touch this moldy bread? Would you like to hold this moldy 
bread?  
[return C back to seat]. Okay, I am going to ask you to go back and sit on your 
seat while I get the next thing ready.  
 
BAT 7. Dirty Diaper.   
Here is a diaper with poop in it. When you look at this diaper, how [“scared”, 
“grossed out or disgusted”] do you feel?”. Would you like to come here to have a 
closer look?  
Would you like to touch this diaper? Would you like to hold this diaper? [return C 
back to seat]. Okay, I am going to ask you to go back and sit on your seat while I 
get the next thing ready.  
 
BAT 8. Needle.    
Here is a needle, like the kind that gives you a shot. When you look at this needle, 
how [“scared”, “grossed out or disgusted”] do you feel?” Would you like to come 
here to have a closer look? Would you like to touch this needle? Would you like to 
hold this needle?  
[return C back to seat]. Okay, I am going to ask you to go back and sit on your 
seat while I get the next thing ready.  
 
BAT 9. Blood.   
Here is a bottle of blood. When you look at this bottle of blood, how [“scared”, 
“grossed out or disgusted”] do you feel?”.  Would you like to come here to have a 
closer look?  
Would you like to touch this bottle of blood? Would you like to hold this bottle of 
blood? [return C back to seat]. Okay, I am going to ask you to go back and sit on 
your seat while I get the next thing ready.  
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BAT 10. Spider.  
Here is a spider. When you look at this spider, how [“scared”, “grossed out or 
disgusted”] do you feel?” Would you like to come here to have a closer look? Would 
you like to touch this spider? Would you like to hold this spider? [return C back to 
seat]. Okay, I am going to ask you to go back and sit on your seat while I get the 
next thing ready.  
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Appendix M 
Calibration & Generated Video Example  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
